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THE TRAJECTORY OF FEDERAL GUN CRIMES

JACOB D. CHARLES† & BRANDON L. GARRETT††
Federal gun prosecutions have been a significant part of the federal
docket for decades. In this Article, we explore for the first time the evolution
of federal gun crimes. They cover conduct ranging from gun distribution and
possession of particular weapons such as machine guns to use by drug
traffickers and individual possession of firearms by felons. Second, we
describe how in practice gun charges have adapted to criminal law priorities
of Congress and federal prosecutors over time. More recently, they became
prominent in connection with immigration prosecutions, while in the 1980s,
drug gangs were the priority. During this time, gun cases provided vehicles
for testing the reach of federal jurisdiction, the use of federal crimes as
sentencing enhancements, and the boundaries between federal, state, and
local enforcement.
We argue federal gun crimes reflect a unique dynamic in which
legislation is shaped by three forces: (1) aggressive interest group lobbying
that leads to compromise on harsh punishment; (2) a dichotomizing of gun
users into either “law-abiding citizens” or “thugs” and “gangsters”; and (3)
prosecutorial power that is magnified in this area due to the ubiquity of
firearms in communities and in criminal activity in the United States, which
both permits broad federal jurisdiction and allows prosecutors to use their
equally broad discretion to leverage severe sentences to obtain plea bargains.
Our overall goal is to illuminate the central, but inconsistent and complex,
place of gun crimes in federal criminal law. We conclude by asking what
principles could guide the development of this body of law through judicial
interpretation, future legislation, and in enforcement, towards a new vision
in which federal law is designed to reduce disparities in enforcement and to
prevent gun violence.
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INTRODUCTION
Gun violence is a pervasively American problem. More than 100,000
Americans are injured in shootings each year, and nearly 40,000 are killed.1
The federal government has largely approached this problem through the
lens—and with the tools—of the criminal law. Federal gun charges are a
mainstay of federal criminal practice, comprising about ten percent of all
federal prosecutions for the past several decades, and a higher percentage in
recent years.2 Some of the most serious mandatory minimum sentences are
for gun offenses, when linked to violent and drug-related crimes.3 As of 2016,
about fifteen percent of all persons in federal prisons were convicted of gun
offenses that carry a mandatory minimum penalty.4 The trajectory of these
federal gun crimes—and the crime-control approach to gun violence itself—
helps to explain the steady growth in prosecutions and the stark racial
disparities among gun offenders in federal prisons today.5 It also helps suggest
a vision for a way forward.6
This Article traces the evolution of the wide spectrum of federal gun
crimes, which cover conduct ranging from gun manufacturing, distribution,
and sales to use by drug traffickers and the individual possession of guns by
those with felony convictions.7 We show how federal prosecutions adapted to
the criminal law priorities of Congress over time. Such charges have increased
in recent years, as they did in the early 2000s.8 More recently, they have
become prominent in immigration-related prosecutions, while in the 1980s,
1 WISQARS™—Web-based Injury Statistics Query and Reporting System, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
& PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/injury/wisqars [https://perma.cc/2EKS-DPY4] (July 1, 2020).
2 See infra Part II.B.
3 See infra Part II.
4 U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES FOR FIREARMS OFFENSES IN
THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 45, 75 n.75 (2018) (reporting that 14.9% of federal
prisoners were convicted for violating § 924(c), which carries a mandatory prison sentence); see also
U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, QUICK FACTS: FEDERAL OFFENDERS IN PRISON–MARCH 2021 (2021),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/quick-facts/BOP_March2021
.pdf [https://perma.cc/W3AP-LTM8] (noting that 19,473 of 135,550 persons serving time for a
federal conviction in federal prison were convicted of firearms offenses).
5 U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES FOR FIREARMS OFFENSES IN
THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 6 (2018) (reporting that Black Americans accounted
for more than half of all offenders convicted of a firearm offense carrying a mandatory minimum
penalty); see also U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, QUICK FACTS: FELON IN POSSESSION OF A FIREARM 1
(2020) (reporting same for offenders convicted of unlawfully possessing a firearm as a felon).
6 Although the majority of criminal prosecutions for gun crimes tend to happen at the state
and local level, we focus on the federal government because it has often been a focal point for
interest-group lobbying on gun issues, holds the most resources for criminal prosecution and
punishment, and often influences state-level legislation and enforcement priorities.
7 See infra Part I.
8 Federal Weapons Prosecutions Rise for Third Consecutive Year, TRAC REPS. (Nov. 29, 2017),
https://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/492 [https://perma.cc/95QW-QJD9].
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drug gangs were the target.9 Over time, firearms cases have provided vehicles
for testing the reach of federal criminal jurisdiction, the use of federal crimes
as sentencing enhancements, and the boundaries—and synergies—between
federal and local enforcement.
Many observers have raised federalism concerns regarding these
developments, including the Supreme Court, in landmark rulings.10 William
Stuntz emphasized: “Local district attorneys can threaten to send drug or gun
crime defendants to the nearest U.S. Attorney’s office . . . . Federal law acts
as an unfunded mandate, raising state sentencing levels without paying for
the increase.”11 The focus has been on what Markus Dubber calls the “offense
of possession—whether of drugs, of guns, or anything else—[which] has
emerged as the policing device of choice in the war on crime.”12
We argue that federal gun crimes are not just a microcosm of larger,
evolving trends in federal criminal priorities, but rather a distinct—and in
many ways unique—body of law that can be better understood as such.13 They
reflect a dynamic in which three factors dominate: (1) legislation is shaped by
aggressive interest group lobbying that ends in compromise on harsh
punishment; (2) judges and lawmakers dichotomize guns, as between “law9 See infra Section II.C.
10 Printz v. United States,

521 U.S. 898, 921-22 (1997); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
575-77 (1995).
11 WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 306 (2011).
12 Markus Dirk Dubber, Policing Possession: The War on Crime and the End of Criminal Law, 91 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 829, 855 (2001). Regarding the question of whether possession must be
active, see Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 143 (1995), which holds that the “use” requirement of
§ 924(c) “requires evidence sufficient to show an active employment” of a firearm; and Bousley v. United
States, 523 U.S. 614, 616 (1998), which applies Bailey. See also Angela LaBuda Collins, The Latest
Amendment to 18 U.S.C. §924(c): Congressional Reaction to the Supreme Court’s Interpretation of the
Statute, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 1319, 1349-50 (1999) (“Congress added the term ‘possession’ to
§924(c)(1) in order to broaden the application of the statute beyond the Supreme Court’s prior
interpretation of the ‘use’ prong.”).
13 The specific combination of these three factors leads us to find the trajectory of federal gun
crimes unique, but there are certainly aspects of this trajectory that have been replicated in the
history of other federal crimes, such as in drug crimes. Taleed El-Sabawi, for example, has explored
how competing interest groups helped frame the government’s approach to drug use and crimes, explaining:
Due in part to the participation of physicians, drug manufacturers, and pharmacists in
the problem-definition discourse, the use and possession of morphine, heroin, and
cocaine remained licit for medicinal purposes throughout the early 1900s . . . . In
essence, the medical industry lobbied Congress to keep these substances licit for
medicinal purposes, while advocating for the punishment of marginalized populations’
illicit or recreational use.
Taleed El-Sabawi, Defining the Opioid Epidemic: Congress, Pressure Groups, and Problem Definition, 48
U. MEM. L. REV. 1357, 1400 (2018); see also Taleed El-Sabawi, The Role of Pressure Groups and Problem
Definition in Crafting Legislative Solutions to the Opioid Crisis, 11 NE. U. L. REV. 372, 375 (2019)
(explaining that interest groups “have historically been influential in defining problem drug use
during nationwide crisis”).
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abiding citizens”14 in contrast to use by thugs and “gangsters”;15 and (3)
prosecutorial power is magnified in this area due to the ubiquity of firearms
in communities and in criminal activity in the United States, which both
permits broad federal jurisdiction and allows prosecutors to use their equally
broad discretion to leverage severe sentences to obtain plea bargains.16 In
surveying the nine decades of federal policymaking around gun crimes, we
see an increasingly dynamic, interactive approach that bears the marks of
these themes.17 All three branches of government have been critical in shaping
the current framework. In the last forty years, Congress has drafted gun
crimes expansively, the Executive has enforced them aggressively, and the
Supreme Court has interpreted them frequently.
The severe penalties that Congress has prescribed for crimes connected
to guns has led to increased prosecutorial power to wield those penalties. The
combination of tough laws and tough enforcers has led to a Supreme Court
especially active in construing the federal firearms laws. We count more than
seventy-five high court opinions since 1937 interpreting the major pieces of
federal legislation; almost all of those cases came after the Gun Control Act
of 1968.18 And the Roberts Court has had a special fondness for federal
14 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (holding that the Second
Amendment “elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use
arms in defense of hearth and home”).
15 National Firearms Act: Hearing on H.R. 9066 Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 73rd
Cong. 136 (1934) (statement of Assistant Attorney General Keenan) (addressing “the problem of the
roving gangster”).
16 Of course, this prosecutorial power is, as we discuss infra, enabled and guided by other
system actors like legislators and judges, as well as by presidential administrations and Attorney
General priorities. See generally Jeffrey Bellin, The Power of Prosecutors, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 171 (2019)
(discussing how prosecutorial power is circumscribed in myriad ways).
17 See infra Part III.
18 Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506 (1937); United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939);
Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943); Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968); United States
v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971); United States v. Biswell,
406 U.S. 311 (1972); Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814 (1974); Barrett v. United States, 423
U.S. 212 (1976); Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563 (1977); Simpson v. United States, 435
U.S. 6 (1978); United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 (1979); Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55
(1980); Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398 (1980); Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., 460 U.S. 103
(1983); Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856 (1985); U.S. Dep’t. of Treasury v. Galioto, 477 U.S. 556
(1986); Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990); United States v. Thompson, 504 U.S. 505
(1992); Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129 (1993); Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993);
Beecham v. United States, 511 U.S. 368 (1994); Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994); Custis
v. United States, 511 U.S. 485 (1994); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); Bailey v. United
States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995); Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997); United States v.
Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1 (1997); United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751 (1997); Printz v. United States,
521 U.S. 898 (1997); Rogers v. United States, 522 U.S. 252 (1998); Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S.
614, (1998); Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998); Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184
(1998); Caron v. United States, 524 U.S. 308 (1998); United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S.
275 (1999); Castillo v. United States, 530 U.S. 120 (2000); Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374
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firearms crimes. The Court has heard more than thirty cases arising under
these laws since 2005.19
Cases concerning federal gun crimes have made blockbuster
constitutional law, including under the Second,20 Fourth,21 Fifth,22 Sixth,23
and Tenth Amendments,24 as well as with respect to Congress’s Commerce
Clause authority25 and taxing power.26 But these cases have more frequently
involved difficult questions of statutory construction,27 requiring the Court
(2001); Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002); United States v. Bean, 537 U.S. 71 (2002);
Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005); Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385 (2005); Dixon v.
United States, 548 U.S. 1 (2006); James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007); Logan v. United
States, 552 U.S. 23 (2007); Watson v. United States, 552 U.S. 74 (2007); Begay v. United States, 553
U.S. 137 (2008); United States v. Rodriquez, 553 U.S. 377 (2008); Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S.
122 (2009); United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415 (2009); Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568 (2009);
Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010); United States v. O’Brien, 560 U.S. 218 (2010); Abbott
v. United States, 562 U.S. 8 (2010); McNeill v. United States, 563 U.S. 816 (2011); Sykes v. United
States, 564 U.S. 1 (2011); Derby v. United States, 564 U.S. 1047 (2011); Alleyne v. United States, 570
U.S. 99 (2013); Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013); Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S.
65 (2014); United States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. 157 (2014); Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S. 169
(2014); Henderson v. United States, 575 U.S. 622 (2015); Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015);
Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016); Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863 (2016);
Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016); Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272 (2016);
Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017); Dean v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1170 (2017); United
States v. Stitt, 139 S. Ct. 399 (2018); Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 544 (2019); Quarles v.
United States, 139 S. Ct. 1872 (2019); Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019); United States v.
Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019); Shular v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 779 (2020).
19 See cases cited supra note 18.
20 See Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 175, 183 (upholding the National Firearms Act against a Second
Amendment challenge).
21 Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 311-13 (finding no Fourth Amendment violation in the authorization
for warrantless search of federal firearm licensees).
22 See Haynes, 390 U.S. 85, 100 (finding the National Firearms Act’s requirement to report an
unregistered firearm in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination);
Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 597 (2015) (finding the residual clause of the Armed Career
Criminal Act unconstitutionally vague, in violation of Fifth Amendment due process); United
States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2336 (2019) (finding § 924(c)’s residual clause void-for-vagueness
under the Fifth Amendment).
23 Alleyne, 570 U.S. 99, 117 (holding in a § 924(c) prosecution that the Sixth Amendment requires
any fact that increases the punishment for a crime to be proved to a jury); Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S.
275, 276 (considering where venue is proper for a § 924(c) charge under the Sixth Amendment).
24 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down the Gun Free School Zone
Act as exceeding Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause).
25 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (striking down portions of the Brady Act
that temporarily required local law enforcement to conduct background checks on gun purchasers).
26 See Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 514 (1937) (upholding the National Firearms
Act as a valid exercise of the taxing power).
27 In just one decade after the enactment of the Gun Control Act of 1968, the Court decided
five major cases interpreting the statute. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971) (construing
the ban on felon firearm possession); Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 815 (1974)
(construing the law criminalizing false statements in connection with acquiring a firearm); Barrett
v. United States, 423 U.S. 212 (1976) (construing the ban on a felon’s receipt of a firearm);
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to, in Justice Kagan’s pithy phrase, leave the “lofty sphere of constitutionalism
for the grittier precincts of criminal law.”28 Since penalties for these crimes
have become so severe, the Court’s attention to these matters has accordingly
taken on heightened importance.29 The Court, for its part, has often read
statutes in the harshest light.30 As the Court said in one case construing 18
U.S.C. § 924(c)’s stiff sentences for use, carrying, or possession of a firearm
in connection with certain crimes: “We do not gainsay that [the petitioners]
project a rational, less harsh, mode of sentencing. But we do not think it was
the mode Congress ordered.”31 And Congress, when it believes the Court has
read a statute too leniently, has not hesitated to clarify its purpose by
amending statutes to cement more punitive constructions of the law.32

Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563 (1977) (construing the ban on felon firearm possession);
Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 7 (1978) (construing the offense that enhances punishment
for use of a gun in a crime).
28 Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1869 (2016); see also id. at 1868 (holding that
the United States and Puerto Rico are not separate sovereigns for Double Jeopardy purposes in
charging gun crimes).
29 E.g., Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 602 (2015) (striking down the residual clause of
the Armed Career Criminals Act, remarking that “[i]nvoking so shapeless a provision to condemn
someone to prison for 15 years to life does not comport with the Constitution’s guarantee of due
process”); United States v. Thompson/Ctr. Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 507-08 (1992) (plurality
opinion) (invoking the rule of lenity in a National Firearms Act case in part because the
consequences of deciding for the government on an ambiguous provision were “serious,” with the
Act carrying “criminal penalties of up to 10 years’ imprisonment and a fine of up to $10,000, or both,
which may be imposed without proof of willfulness or knowledge”).
30 See, e.g., Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S. 169, 193 (2014) (holding that a
misrepresentation as to actual buyer is a materially false statement even if actual buyer and straw
buyer could both legally purchase and possess firearms).
The Court has, in recent years, grown seemingly more cognizant of what can sometimes seem
like a gratuitous severity in the penalties. See, e.g., Dean v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1170, 1176 (2017)
(“Dean committed the two robberies at issue here when he was 23 years old. That he will not be
released from prison until well after his fiftieth birthday because of the § 924(c) convictions surely
bears on whether—in connection with his predicate crimes—still more incarceration is necessary to
protect the public.”).
31 Abbott v. United States, 562 U.S. 8, 23 (2010).
32 Consider just two examples. In Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398, 399-400 (1980), the
Court held that § 924(c)’s extra punishment did not apply if the underlying predicate offense was
itself a firearm offense. Four years later, Congress rejected that approach and clarified it did apply
in those circumstances. See Abbott, 562 U.S. at 23 (2010) (describing how Congress’ amendment of
§924(c) in 1984 “repudiated” the Court’s prior holding in Busic (quoting United States v. Gonzales,
520 U.S. 1, 10 (1997))). In Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995), the Court held that mere
possession of a firearm during a relevant crime does not count as “use” of a firearm for purposes of
the § 924(c) enhancements. Three years later, “Congress responded to Bailey by amending
§ 924(c)(1). The amendment broadened the provision to cover a defendant who” merely possesses a
firearm in furtherance of a qualifying crime. Watson v. United States, 552 U.S. 74, 77 n.3 (2007).
One notable exception is the Firearms Owners’ Protection Act, which generally provided
greater solicitude for gun dealers and potential dealers and also for those who had received state
relief from their convictions. See infra Part I.B.
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The existing literature on federal gun crimes does not give a holistic
picture of the history, trends, and effects of this body of law. Most scholarship
on gun regulation tends to focus either on the Second Amendment’s right to
keep and bear arms or on narrow aspects of criminal enforcement or judicial
interpretation.33 The former literature often includes little or no discussion
of criminal enforcement, including the severe mandatory minimums
penalties that have become an increasingly important part of the federal
framework.34 The latter literature often focuses narrowly on one substantive
provision or piece of legislation without linking these to the broader, evolving
context.35 The result is separate literatures about “gun control” and about federal
criminal law that speak to different audiences and for different purposes.36
This Article bridges that divide. It describes the arc of federal criminal
gun laws, from provisions focusing on regulating commercial manufacturing,
distribution, and sale of firearms; to an extensive focus on individuals, in
order to target a wide range of gun-related but also not-primarily gun-related
criminal conduct; to a broader federal, systematic, and collaborative effort to

33 See, e.g., Jeffrey Bellin, The Right to Remain Armed, 93 WASH. U.L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2015)
(discussing the constitutionality under the Fourth Amendment of gun possession as a basis for police
search and seizure); Joseph Blocher, Gun Rights Talk, 94 B.U. L. REV. 813, 832 (2014) (outlining the
gap between constitutional rhetoric and doctrine on the issue of firearms); Pratheepan Gulasekaram,
“The People” of the Second Amendment: Citizenship and the Right to Bear Arms, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1521,
1538 (2010) (discussing the implications of the protected class identified in the Heller decision);
Fredrick E. Vars, Symptom-Based Gun Control, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1633, 1646-47 (2014) (arguing that
due process would not be violated if police or mental health professionals had the power to confiscate
firearms from individuals suffering delusions or hallucinations); Luke Morgan, Note, Leave Your
Guns at Home: The Constitutionality of a Prohibition on Carrying Firearms at Political Demonstrations, 68
DUKE L.J. 175, 179, 211-13 (2018) (“[C]ourts should adopt the following test: a place is sensitive
under Heller when introducing guns into that place seriously threatens core First Amendment
interests or activity.”).
34 See, e.g., ALEXANDER DECONDE, GUN VIOLENCE IN AMERICA: THE STRUGGLE FOR
CONTROL (2001) (surveying in depth the history of federal gun laws but with only passing
references to mandatory minimum penalties); William J. Vizzard, The Current and Future State of
Gun Policy in the United States, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 879, 879-83 (2015) [hereinafter
Vizzard, Current and Future Policy] (providing a summary of federal gun regulations but mentioning
existing sentencing penalties only in passing); PATRICK J. CHARLES, ARMED IN AMERICA: A
HISTORY OF GUN RIGHTS FROM COLONIAL MILITIAS TO CONCEALED CARRY (2018) (providing
a history of gun rights and regulation without focusing on criminal penalties).
35 For a detailed exploration of how enhanced sentences have expanded jurisdiction and reshaped
enforcement, see Sara Sun Beale, The Unintended Consequences of Enhancing Gun Penalties: Shooting Down
the Commerce Clause and Arming Federal Prosecutors, 51 DUKE L.J. 1641, 1643 (2002). For another important
exception in the literature—a detailed examination of race and class critiques of federal gun
enforcement—see Benjamin Levin, Guns and Drugs, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2173, 2179-84 (2016).
36 Cf. William J. Vizzard, The Impact of Agenda Conflict on Policy Formulation and Implementation:
The Case of Gun Control, 55 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 341, 345 (1995) [hereinafter Vizzard, Impact]
(“[O]pponents characterize gun control as the alternative to strategies such as mandatory
sentencing, while defining legitimate control strategies as those that exclusively and immediately
impact known criminals.”).
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target gun violence. We question why the crime-control paradigm has been
central to federal efforts to combat gun violence, how this focus has ignored
the underlying causes of that violence, and how the federal government might
play a less punitive role.
In Part I, we describe the enactment and substance of the major federal
gun crimes legislation. We start in Section A with the beginning of federal
firearms regulation–the 1934 National Firearms Act (“NFA”),37 which levied
taxes on manufacturers and owners of certain types of especially dangerous
firearms, like machine guns. In Section B, we detail statutes, starting in the
late 1960s and continuing through the 1980s and 1990s, that cemented the
focus on individual possession offenses and harsh punishment. In Section C,
we describe more recent statutes that have focused on upstream regulatory
gun laws, like background checks.
In Part II, we discuss how these criminal statutes are enforced. Using U.S.
Administrative Office of the Courts data we compiled for this Article, we
emphasize how, despite the proliferation of weapons offenses, felon-inpossession offenses have dominated prosecutions beginning in the 1980s, with
a steady rise in the number and length of sentences in each decade since. We
also describe other changes in enforcement, including the creation of national
data-tracking; the building of federal, state, and local partnerships to combat
gun violence; and new uses of gun-charges as federal prosecution priorities
have changed, including a focus on gun-charges in immigration enforcement.
In Part III, we step back to identify the patterns, probe the pathologies,
and chart the path forward to a more reasonable and coherent approach to
the federal regulation of guns. We suggest these statutes share a remarkable
legislative dynamic, in which powerful interests are arrayed on both sides. A
compromise between otherwise antagonistic parties leads to agreement on
harsher penalties and more severe punishment. We also describe how
institutional forces and administrative enforcement priorities have shaped the
use of these statutes. Finally, we examine the two-fold effects of this system
on inequality, where under-resourced minoritized communities are both
disproportionately victims of gun violence and targeted by federal
sentencing. We ask why successful community-based efforts to prevent gun
violence have not received strong federal support. And we conclude by
asking what principles could guide the development of this body of federal
firearms law through judicial interpretation, future legislation, and
enforcement towards a new vision in which federal gun efforts serve
primarily to prevent gun violence.

37

26 U.S.C. §§ 5801–72.
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I. FEDERAL FIREARMS STATUTES
This Part provides a three-part account of the evolution of federal gun
crimes in the United States. In Section A, we set out the origins of the earliest
gun crimes. In Section B, we detail federal statutes that cemented a focus on
punishing individual firearm possession and imposing severe sentences. In
Section C, we describe more recent statutes that have typically focused on
regulatory measures, such as background checks.
A. Early Federal Firearms Crimes
As early as 1945, political scientist David Fellman observed that “federal
criminal jurisdiction has steadily expanded from humble beginnings into the
vast complex of power it is today.”38 Two major laws regulating firearms in
the 1930s formed part of this federal expansion: the National Firearms Act
(“NFA”) and Federal Firearms Act (“FFA”). These, it turns out, would be
the federal government’s only major firearm regulations for the next three
decades—decades in which the nature of commerce, crime, and national
power changed dramatically.
1. The National Firearms Act (1934)
The NFA was the federal government’s first substantial entry into the
field of firearms regulation.39 It came at a time ripe for federal intervention:
“The late 1920s and early 1930s brought . . . a growing perception of crime
both as a major problem and as a national one.”40 State and local authorities,
which had been expanding their regulation over weapon possession and carrying,
were incapable of addressing the increasing mobility of crime and criminals.41

38 David Fellman, Some Consequences of Increased Federal Activity in Law Enforcement, 35 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 16, 16 (1944).
39 The only prior federal firearms regulation was a 1927 ban on mailing concealable firearms
through the U.S. Postal Service (but not through private carriers). Act of Feb. 8, 1927, Pub. L. No.
69-583, 44 Stat. 1059 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1715); see also ROBERT J. SPITZER, THE
POLITICS OF GUN CONTROL 185 (7th ed. 2018) (“This measure passed when other gun control efforts
failed because its supporters justified it as a measure that supported, rather than eroded, state sovereignty.”).
40 David T. Hardy, The Firearms Owners’ Protection Act: A Historical and Legal Perspective, 17
CUMB. L. REV. 585, 590 (1987).
41 See Carol Skalnik Leff & Mark H. Leff, The Politics of Ineffectiveness: Federal Firearms
Legislation, 1919-38, 455 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 48, 49 (1981) (“This upsurge of federal
activism was in large part a response to problems encountered in the enforcement of state legislation.”).
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The battle over the NFA was heated.42 The primary locus of dispute was
not the Second Amendment,43 however, but instead whether the federal or
state government should be the entity responsible for firearm regulations.44
Another battle concerned what the law should cover. As initially conceived by
Attorney General Homer Cummings, the law would have required the
registration of machine guns, as well as concealable weapons such as pistols,
revolvers, and short-barrel shotguns or rifles.45 The inclusion of pistols and
revolvers in the law generated significant controversy.
The National Rifle Association proved successful at organizing grassroots
support to thwart the handgun registration component.46 The NFA
ultimately regulated only a small subset of firearms thought particularly
useful for criminal activity through a registration and taxation regime.47
First, the NFA required all manufacturers, importers, and dealers of
“firearms” to register with the government and pay an annual tax.48 Reflecting
42 See John Brabner-Smith, Firearm Regulation, 1 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 400, 400 (1934)
(“Among these bills sponsored by the Attorney General of the United States, Homer S. Cummings,
none has received more general attention and bitter criticism than the bill proposing to regulate the
manufacture, importation, and disposition of certain types of firearms.”).
43 The Second Amendment was almost entirely an afterthought. See National Firearms Act:
Hearings on H.R. 9066 Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 73rd Cong. 53 (1934). Almost all of
the debate took place in terms of what level of government—state or federal—was the proper entity
to regulate deadly weapons. Indeed, in response to DOJ concerns about gangsters traveling with
private arsenals escaping federal authority, Congressman (and future Supreme Court Justice) Fred
Vinson, an opponent of the bill, asked the DOJ’s witness whether there would be anything to stop
a state “from making it a penalty punishable with death to carry a revolver.” Id. at 119. The DOJ’s
witness replied he supposed it would be within a state’s police power to do so: “[T]here would be
no restriction on a sovereignty to pass a law with respect to anything that affected the public welfare
of that sovereignty.” Id. Neither suggested such a draconian law enacted at the state level might run
afoul of the Second Amendment. But that does not mean the “theory of individual rights” was
altogether absent; there was some brief discussion about how prohibition and not regulation could
impact the right to keep and bear arms. Id. at 18-19.
44 See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Crime: Assessing the Impact on the Federal Courts, 543
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 39, 42 (1996) (“These enactments reflected a willingness on the
part of the Congress that had enacted the New Deal social and economic legislation to assert jurisdiction
over an increasingly broad range of conduct clearly within the traditional police powers of the states.”).
45 See David B. Kopel, The Great Gun Control War of the Twentieth Century-and Its Lessons for Gun
Laws Today, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1527, 1533 (2012) (“Cummings was . . . highly interested in gun
control. His objective was national registration for all firearms, and the de facto prohibition of handguns.”).
46 See SPITZER, supra note 39, at 186 (“Even in this early stage, the NRA spearheaded the
antiregulation movement.”); F.J.K, Restrictions on the Right to Bear Arms: State and Federal Firearms
Legislation, 98 U. PA. L. REV. 905, 917 (1950) (reporting inclusion of handguns “met strong organized
opposition from sportsmen and rifle associations, with the result that reference to pistols and
revolvers was deleted, and a pure revenue measure, on its face, enacted”).
47 The title says it all: “An Act [t]o provide for the taxation of manufacturers, importers, and
dealers in certain firearms and machine guns, to tax the sale or other disposal of such weapons, and
to restrict importation and regulate interstate transportation thereof.” National Firearms Act, Pub.
L. No. 73-474, 48 Stat. 1236, 1236 (1934) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801, 5849).
48 Id. § 2.
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its narrowed reach, the Act defined “firearms” in a technical way to only
include machine guns, short-barrel shotguns or rifles, and silencers.49
Second, the NFA created an excise tax on firearm transfers (the first
federal excise tax on firearm purchases had been adopted in 1919). It
mandated specific paperwork and record-keeping requirements to document
payment of the transfer tax, the serial number of the firearm transferred, and
the identity of the person taking possession.50 With the requirements for
documentation accompanying each transfer, the Act created a comprehensive
(or nearly so) record of the ownership and chain of title for each covered
firearm.51 To make the system reasonably complete, anyone who already
possessed a covered weapon at the time of the NFA’s enactment had 60 days
to record, “with the collector of the district in which he resides, the number
or other mark identifying such firearm, together with his name, address, place
where such firearm is usually kept, and place of business or employment.”52
In implementing this regime, the NFA created a number of new federal
crimes, each carrying a potential prison term of up to five years.53 But, in
what would be a harbinger of implementation woes, Congress vested
enforcement authority in the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.54 The
Revenue Bureau did not prioritize enforcement of the Act.55 Yet at least one
notable prosecution arose, nonetheless. In United States v. Miller, two men
were charged with violating the NFA by transporting an unregistered shortbarrel shotgun across state lines.56 The district court quashed the indictments
on the ground that the NFA violated the Second Amendment.57 The
Supreme Court, however, reversed, holding the Act valid.58
In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a
“shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length” at this time
has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well

Id. § 1(a).
Id. § 4.
Leff & Leff, supra note 41, at 54 (“The intent [of the NFA] was to regulate firearms with a
registration and transfer tax program under which guns could be identified and traced to their owners.”).
52 National Firearms Act § 5(a).
53 Id. § 14 (articulating punitive measures for any person “who violates or fails to comply with
any of the requirements of [the National Firearms Act]”).
54 Id. § 12.
55 See Vizzard, Impact, supra note 36, at 342 (noting that the law came under the jurisdiction of
the IRS’s Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division, “where it received little attention”).
56 307 U.S. 174, 175 (1939).
57 Id. at 177.
58 Id. at 183.
49
50
51
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regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the
right to keep and bear such an instrument.59

Similarly, decades later, the Court again confronted a question about how
to apply the Act’s steep criminal penalties. In Staples v. United States, the Court
held that to sustain a conviction for possession of an unregistered weapon—there,
a machine gun—the Government had “to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
[the defendant] knew the weapon he possessed had the characteristics that
brought it within the statutory definition of a machinegun.”60
The NFA was an attempt to strike at a narrow slice of especially
dangerous weapons used by a narrow slice of lawbreakers. Opponents of a
broader law effectively ensured that the overwhelming majority of ordinary
gun owners would feel no impact from the law.
2. The Federal Firearms Act (1938)
Just a few years later, there was another drive for federal legislation. The
Federal Firearms Act, however, resulted more from industry pressure than
from pro-regulation impetus. The Department of Justice, under Attorney
General Cummings’s pressure, had continued in the years after the NFA’s
passage to push for the inclusion of handguns in the registration and taxation
system it established.61 That did not happen. “Shepherded through the
Congress by the National Rifle Association, the 1938 Act was pressed” in large
part to deflect from these efforts.62
Nonetheless, the FFA “established the dominant model of federal gun
control for the rest of the twentieth century.”63 The FFA’s main
accomplishments were (1) a more comprehensive manufacturer and dealer
licensing system, and (2) the creation of a class of prohibited persons who
could not receive, ship, or transport weapons. We look briefly at each.
First, the Act established that any person who manufactured or dealt in
firearms of any kind, not just NFA-defined firearms, had to get a license from
the Treasury Department if they shipped or received firearms in interstate
59 Id. at 178. Some scholars see Miller as a set-up to validate new congressional power over
firearms legislation. See, e.g., Brian L. Frye, The Peculiar Story of United States v. Miller, 3 N.Y.U.
J.L. & LIBERTY 48, 50 (2008) (“Miller was a Second Amendment test case, teed up with a nominal
defendant by a district judge sympathetic to New Deal gun control measures.”).
60 511 U.S. 600, 602 (1994).
61 See Franklin E. Zimring, Firearms and Federal Law: The Gun Control Act of 1968, 4 J. LEGAL
STUD. 133, 138 (1975) (“When the handgun registration segment of the bill was deleted [from the
NFA] in the House, the Justice Department continued to introduce handgun registration proposals,
and to fight for them throughout the 1930s, long after crime control had lost its place in the hierarchy
of New Deal legislative goals.”).
62 Id. at 139.
63 JAMES B. JACOBS, CAN GUN CONTROL WORK? 22 (2002).
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commerce.64 The license requirement was imposed on any person “engaged
in the business” of selling, repairing, or manufacturing firearms interstate—a
phrase the act did not define.65 Notably, a manufacturer or dealer who did not
ship or receive firearms in interstate commerce, such as a gun shop serving
only local customers, would not need a license under the Act.66
Licensees (often referred to as Federal Firearm Licensees or “FFLs”)
were forbidden from transferring firearms in interstate commerce to certain
classes of persons, including any nonresident who did not present a purchase
license if her state required one.67 Nor could licensees transfer to any person
“knowing or having reasonable cause to believe”68 that the person was (1) under
indictment for or convicted of a “crime of violence”69 or (2) a fugitive from justice.70
The Act’s scienter requirement for forbidden transfers proved to be a
major enforcement obstacle. Not only had gun-rights advocates effectively
removed the bulk of private firearms from the regulatory scope of the NFA,
but they also considerably weakened the ambit of the FFA’s criminal
prohibitions. As Carol and Mark Leff describe,
[A] keystone of the draft bill had been the power to prosecute shippers and
manufacturers who put guns into the hands of fugitives or criminals
convicted of crimes of violence. The antiregulation forces, however, protested
that this stricture would place an unfair burden on the commercial enterprises
engaged in gun sales and transport. They offered modifying phrases that
assured the act’s debilitation; businesses would be liable to penalty only if
they could be convicted of “knowing or having reasonable cause to believe”
that the purchaser had a criminal background.71

This change allowed, and even encouraged, a head-in-the-sand approach.
Licensees had no incentive to check whether someone who wanted to
purchase a gun was a convicted criminal, no mechanism to do so even if they

64 Federal Firearms Act, Pub. L. No. 75-785, § 2(a), 52 Stat. 1250, 1250 (1938), repealed by Pub.
L. No. 90-351, § 906, 82 Stat. 197, 234 (1968).
65 Id. § 1(5).
66 Hardy, supra note 40, at 598-99 (explaining that the FFA only required licensing for those
“engaged in the business” of interstate commerce for firearms).
67 Federal Firearms Act § 2(c).
68 Id. § 2(d).
69 Id. § 1(6). A “crime of violence” was defined by listing qualifying offenses: “murder,
manslaughter, rape, mayhem, kidnaping, burglary, housebreaking; assault with intent to kill, commit
rape, or rob; assault with a dangerous weapon, or assault with intent to commit any offense
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year.” Id.
70 Id. § 2(d).
71 Leff & Leff, supra note 41, at 55.
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wanted, and no legal obligation to perform any due diligence.72 Thus, “[f]rom
the standpoint of prosecuting dealers for violation of the federal ban against
sale to felons, the requirement of knowledge, coupled with the absence of a
verification system, rendered the Act stillborn.”73
Second, in addition to these requirements for licensees, the Act imposed
restrictions directly on several groups of prohibited persons. Fugitives and
those under indictment for or convicted of a crime of violence were forbidden
from shipping or transporting firearms in interstate commerce or receiving
guns that had been so shipped or transported.74 They were not, however,
forbidden from merely possessing such firearms, as later legislation would
provide.75 But the Act did make mere possession “presumptive evidence that
such firearm or ammunition was shipped or transported or received . . . . in
violation of this Act.”76 As noted infra, the Supreme Court later struck down
this presumption in Tot v. United States.77
The proposed bill originally vested authority for enforcement in the
Commerce Department, as the measure was justified under Congress’s power
over interstate commerce (unlike the NFA, which was a taxing measure).78
Ultimately, however, the House amended the bill to place Treasury in
charge.79 Once again, charging a Treasury Department component with
enforcing the Act proved to neuter it further.80 “That department could
summon up little interest for such a manifestly nonfinancial program.”81

72

Additionally, the ability to prosecute gun sellers was severely hindered:
[T]he key power to prosecute those who bore responsibility for putting guns in the
hands of criminals was effectively neutralized when language added in committee
made successful federal prosecution dependent on being able to prove that the gun
provider sold guns to criminals knowingly, a standard the Justice Department knew it
could rarely if ever meet.

SPITZER, supra note 39, at 185-86
73 Zimring, supra note 61, at 140.
74 Federal Firearms Act § 2(e)-(f).
75 See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 102, 82 Stat. 1213, 122021 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 921) (barring mere possession for designated classes of people).
76 Id. § 2(f).
77 See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
78 Firearms: Hearing on S. 3 Before A Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Com.,
75th Cong. 11 (1937) (describing confusion that vesting the two different federal laws on firearms in
different departments would have on administration).
79 H.R. REP. NO. 75-2663 (1938).
80 Zimring, supra note 61, at 140 (noting that the FFA was “crippled by a tradition of less-thanDraconian enforcement by the Internal Revenue Service”).
81 Leff & Leff, supra note 41, at 56.
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The FFA imposed the same penalties as the NFA: up to five years in
prison for a violation.82 Like the NFA, the FFA did not become a major law
enforcement priority. Robert Spitzer calls it “[s]ymptomatic of the impotency
of this legislation” that “fewer than one hundred arrests per year were made
under any provision of the act from the 1930s to the 1960s.”83
Yet, like the NFA, the criminal provisions created constitutional doctrine
nonetheless. In Tot v. United States,84 two men challenged their convictions
for receiving a firearm after having been convicted of a crime of violence. At
issue in the case was the presumption that mere possession by a prohibited
person was evidence the person had received the firearm in violation of the
Act.85 The Supreme Court held the presumption not consistent with due
process—“the presumptions created by the law are violent, and inconsistent
with any argument drawn from experience”—and reversed the convictions.86
After the FFA, the gun issue largely dropped off the national radar. As
William Vizzard notes, “crime rates began a decline in 1934 that would
continue for almost three decades, and the limited public and congressional
interest in gun control abated.”87 “It would,” he observes, “take a presidential
assassination to rekindle it.”88
B. The Transition to a Focus on Possession
In this Section, we trace how the turmoil of the 1960s and the rising
tough-on-crime politics of the 1980s and 1990s led to types of legislation that
ended up cementing a focus on possession offenses and steep punishment.
We turn first to (1) the Gun Control Act of 1968, and then examine (2) the
Armed Career Criminal Act, (3) the Sentencing Guidelines, and (4) the
Firearm Owners Protection Act.
1. The Gun Control Act of 1968
There were no major federal gun laws in the three decades between 1938
and 1968.89 Nor, does it seem, had federal law enforcement priorities shifted
much: in 1947, the Department of Justice brought a meager 66 criminal cases
82 Federal Firearms Act, Pub. L. No. 75-785, § 5, 52 Stat. 1250, 1252 (1938), repealed by Pub. L.
No. 90-351, § 906, 82 Stat. 197, 234 (1968) (defining punitive measures for any person violating the
FFA or “any rules and regulations promulgated hereunder”).
83 SPITZER, supra note 39, at 186.
84 Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 464-66 (1943).
85 Id. at 464.
86 Id. at 468.
87 See Vizzard, Impact, supra note 36, at 342.
88 Vizzard, Current and Future Policy, supra note 34, at 882.
89 See Zimring, supra note 61, at 133 (remarking that the GCA was “the only major change in
federal policy since 1938”).
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for federal weapons offenses.90 Twenty years later, in 1967, there were still
only 371 such cases brought—out of more than 30,000 total federal prosecutions.91
What became the Gun Control Act of 1968 was debated in Congress for
five years, and was eventually “signed at the height of civil unrest”92 that
resulted from political protests and high-profile political assassinations.93 Part
of the original impetus for the law was a post-war increase in cheap, mostly
military surplus, firearms imported into the United States.94 Another reason
for legislative action in the 1960s was the elevation of Connecticut Senator,
and former FBI agent, Thomas Dodd to chairperson of the Senate
Subcommittee on Juvenile Delinquency in 1961.95 Although Senator Dodd’s
initial efforts to prohibit mail-order sales of handguns (and later, after JFK’s
assassination, of shotguns and rifles too) failed,96 federal gun regulation was
back on the table as a serious proposal.97 Meanwhile, President Lyndon
Johnson’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of
Justice issued its influential report in 1967, “The Challenge of Crime in a Free
Society,” which included a chapter calling for national gun laws.98
In June 1968, in a prelude to the GCA, Congress passed the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act.99 In addition to its other major
provisions, Title IV and Title VII of the Act contained new gun laws. Title
IV modified the FFA and also fulfilled part of Senator Dodd’s goal of banning
90 ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS tbl.D-2 (1947).
91 ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS tbl.D-2 (1967).
92 Emma Luttrell Shreefter, Federal Felon-in-Possession Gun Laws: Criminalizing A Status,
Disparately Affecting Black Defendants, and Continuing the Nation’s Centuries-Old Methods to Disarm
Black Communities, 21 CUNY L. REV. 143, 170 (2018).
93 Vizzard, Current and Future Policy, supra note 34, at 882 (describing how the assassinations
of President John F. Kennedy and Martin Luther King, Jr. galvanized support for the GCA).
94 William J. Vizzard, The Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 ST. LOUIS UNIV. PUB. L. REV. 79, 79
(1999) [hereinafter Vizzard, Gun Control Act].
95 John Q. Barrett, From Justice Jackson to Thomas J. Dodd to Nuremberg 4 (St. John’s U. Legal
Stud. Rsch. Paper Series, Paper No. 05-00, 2005); see also Zimring, supra note 61, at 145.
96 Zimring, supra note 61, at 145-46.
97 Vizzard, Gun Control Act, supra note 94, at 80 (“Between 1938 and 1965, Congress had
displayed little discernable interest in gun control legislation; however, external events,
administration interest, and public opinion altered the policy dynamics within Congress over the
next four years and opened the policy window.”).
98 See Philip J. Cook, Challenge of Firearms Control in a Free Society, 17 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB.
POL’Y 437, 438 (2018) (“In looking back from today’s vantage point, one can only marvel that a
politically diverse national commission could reach consensus on these recommendations, which
include universal gun registration and permit-to-purchase requirements. Also remarkable is that the
Commission’s analysis in support of these recommendations could not draw on systematic empirical
research for the simple reason that no such research had been published yet.”).
99 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat, 197
(codified at 34 U.S.C. § 10101).

654

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 170: 637

the interstate shipment of handguns to individuals. It also prohibited
purchasing handguns out of state.100 These provisions were amended and reenacted as part of the GCA, discussed below.101
Title VII of the Act put in place the first federal law barring, for specific
categories of people, mere possession of a firearm in or affecting interstate
commerce.102 The categories of people so barred were similar but not identical
to those contained in Title IV (amending the FFA), which only barred those
people from shipping, transporting, or receiving (but not from possessing)
firearms.103 In that sense, “Title VII and Title IV are, in part, redundant.”104
As the Supreme Court recognized a few years after it was signed into law,
“Title VII was a last-minute Senate amendment . . . [that] was hastily passed,
with little discussion, no hearings, and no report.”105 One commentator
describes the rationale: Title VII “became law with little analysis largely as a
political favor to improve its author’s image as tough on crime.”106
Coming off the heels of that omnibus bill, Senator Dodd introduced “an
administration-backed gun bill in the Senate that had as its centerpiece the
registration of all firearms and licensing of gun owners.”107 This was not to
be. The fate of these two provisions of the bill, excised after intense lobbying
and grassroots organizing by the NRA, showed the group’s political clout and

SPITZER, supra note 39, at 187.
See Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212, 219-20 (1976) (“The Gun Control Act of 1968
was an amended [sic] and, for present purposes, a substantially identical version of Title IV of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.”).
102 Vizzard, Gun Control Act, supra note 94, at 84 (“Title VII addressed simple firearm
possession for the first time at the federal level.”). Those classes included: (1) those with a prior
felony conviction, (2) those dishonorably discharged from the armed forces, (3) those adjudged
mentally incompetent, (4) those who renounced their citizenship, and (5) unlawful aliens. Id. at 88
n.77. Although the FFA banned shipment, receipt, and transport, it did not ban mere possession.
See Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 472 (1943) (“[I]t is plain that Congress, for whatever reason,
did not seek to pronounce general prohibition of possession by certain residents of the various states
of firearms in order to protect interstate commerce, but dealt only with their future acquisition in
interstate commerce.”). The Court was mistaken when it recently described the FFA otherwise. See
Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2198 (2019) (“Congress first enacted a criminal statute
prohibiting particular categories of persons from possessing firearms in 1938.”).
103 The GCA categories included: (1) those under indictment for or convicted of a crime
punishable by more than a year imprisonment, (2) fugitives from justice, (3) unlawful drug users,
and (4) those adjudicated as a “mental defective” or who had previously been committed. Gun
Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, sec.102, § 922(h), 82 Stat. 1213, 1220-21 (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. § 922(h)).
104 United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 343 (1971).
105 Id. at 344.
106 Vizzard, Gun Control Act, supra note 94, at 84.
107 SPITZER, supra note 39, at 188.
100
101
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influence over the scope of firearms regulations.108 In the resulting
“compromise with the NRA,” observes David Kopel, “[t]here would be no
federal licensing of gun owners. Gun sales would be registered, but only by
the dealer, not the government.”109
As signed into law, the GCA had several main components covering both
the manufacturing and distribution process as well as individual-level gun
use. It extended the FFA requirements mandating licensure for anyone in the
business of manufacturing, importing, or dealing firearms, not just those who
shipped or received such firearms in interstate commerce.110 The law also
(1) banned interstate shipments of firearms to individuals, (2) increased
dealer licensing and record-keeping requirements, (3) prohibited the
importation of most foreign-made surplus arms, (4) added to the classes of
persons prohibited from purchasing guns, and (5) increased the punishment
for those who used a gun in a crime.111
The GCA set up a dual penalty track for violations. Like the NFA and
FFA before it, the GCA generally prescribed a maximum sentence of five
years imprisonment for any violation, but it also singled out several acts that
merited longer punishment. Anyone who shipped, transferred, or received a
gun intending to commit a felony, or with reasonable cause to believe one
would be committed, faced up to ten years in prison.112
It also increased punishment for using a gun in a crime—and set a
mandatory sentencing floor. In the first incarnation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)’s
enhancement offense, the Act provided (1) using a firearm to commit a federal
felony or (2) carrying a firearm unlawfully during the commission of a federal
felony would be punishable by a mandatory minimum of one year of
imprisonment and a maximum of ten years.113 A second conviction for use or
unlawful carrying under this subsection resulted in a mandatory minimum of
two years and a maximum of 25 years in prison.114 For that recidivist,
“notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court shall not suspend the
sentence . . . of such person or give him a probationary sentence.”115

108 Vizzard, Gun Control Act, supra note 94, at 80-81 (describing the NRA membership’s
radicalization on gun issues, pushing its leadership to reject stricter gun control policies they
previously supported).
109 Kopel, supra note 45, at 1545.
110 Vizzard, Gun Control Act, supra note 94, at 87.
111 Id. at 87-88 (describing changes enacted in the GCA); Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L.
No. 90-618, sec. 102, § 924(c), 82 Stat. 1213, 1224 (imposing increased penalties for gun use in a
crime) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)).
112 18 U.S.C. § 924(b) (1968).
113 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1968).
114 Id.
115 Id.
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We pause here to underscore the importance of § 924(c) because of its
increasing relevance in federal criminal enforcement. In 2016, for example,
about one in every thirty-three offenders sentenced for violating federal law
was sentenced under this provision.116 Congress here created, in the Supreme
Court’s words, a “combination crime . . . [that] punishes the temporal and
relational conjunction of two separate acts, on the ground that together they
pose an extreme risk of harm.”117 It punishes the combination of using or
carrying a gun and committing a separate federal crime. Surprisingly, though,
this new offense was not a central component of the legislation. The provision
was not part of the original House bill but was instead proposed as an
amendment on the House floor and swiftly passed.118 “Because the provision
was passed on the same day it was introduced on the House floor, it is the
subject of no legislative hearings or committee reports.”119
And because of the provision’s increasing centrality in firearms
prosecutions, Congress has frequently revised the statute, often to expand it
and add increasingly severe mandatory minimum sentences where there were
once relatively minor ones. Indeed, in the span of just 14 years, “[b]etween
1984 and 1998, Congress expanded the reach or increased the severity of
§ 924(c) on four occasions.”120 We detail some of the major changes.
First, Congress amended the statute in 1971, just three years after the
GCA’s passage, to mandate that “the term of imprisonment imposed under
this subsection” shall not “run concurrently with any term of imprisonment
imposed for the commission of such felony” that generated the charge.121
Next, in 1984, concurrently with the Sentencing Reform Act, Congress
limited the enhancement to using or carrying a firearm during or in relation
to a “crime of violence,” but changed the applicable sentences to a flat

116 For the complete text and changes to the statute over time, see the Appendix. See also U.S.
SENT’G COMM’N, MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES FOR FEDERAL FIREARMS OFFENSES IN THE
FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 19 (2018) (providing that 1,976 offenders were convicted of at least
one offense under § 924(c) in 2016, which represented 2.9% of federal offenders sentenced that year),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/researchpublications/2018/20180315_Firearms-Mand-Min.pdf [https://perma.cc/G9BH-P8KV].
117 Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65, 75 (2014).
118 Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 13 (1978) (describing the legislative history of
§ 924(c)).
119 Id. at 13 n.7.
120 Abbott v. United States, 562 U.S. 8, 23 (2010).
121 Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-644, sec. 13, § 924(c), 84 Stat. 1880,
1889-90 (1971) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)). The Act did lower the mandatory
minimum for second or subsequent offenses from five years to two years, but, in combination with
mandatory consecutive sentencing, it is not clear this made the statute more lenient.
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mandatory five-year term for first offenders and a ten-year term for a second
or subsequent conviction.122
Two years later, as part of the Firearm Owners’ Protection Act (“FOPA”),
which we discuss in more detail below, Congress again expanded the
enhancement. It added drug-trafficking crimes to crimes of violence as
predicate offenses and added a ten-year flat sentence for cases involving
machine guns or silencers (and twenty years for a second or subsequent
offense).123 FOPA also added a definition for both types of predicate
offenses, definitions that would serve to generate significant litigation in
the years to come.124
In 1998, Congress divided § 924(c)(1) from a single paragraph into a set
of four detailed subsections, more carefully delineating the sentencing
options, and with mandatory minimum sentences in place of the prior flat
sentence depending on whether and how the firearm was used.125 At the same
time, Congress also amended § 924(c) to outlaw not only “use” in relation to
a predicate offense, but also the possession of a firearm “in furtherance” of a
predicate drug-trafficking or violent offense.126
Finally, in 2018, as part of the First Step Act, Congress made its first
change to make the statute more lenient. In response to Deal v. United
States,127 which held that a “second or subsequent conviction” could be one
that came in the same proceeding as the first conviction, Congress revised the
provision to clarify that the recidivist enhancement is only available after a
prior conviction has become final.128
The Gun Control Act of 1968 remains to this day the governing
framework for federal firearms laws. But at the time of its enactment, neither
side was completely happy with the law; advocates for tighter regulation
bemoaned the NRA’s success in eliminating stricter requirements, while gunrights activists claimed the NRA failed them in allowing a gun bill to pass at

122 Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, sec. 1005, § 924(c), 98 Stat.
1837, 2138 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)).
123 Firearms Owners’ Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, sec. 104(a)(2), § 924(c), 100 Stat.
449, 456-57 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)).
124 FOPA provided a “crime of violence” is a felony that either (1) “has as an element the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another,” or is a
crime that (2) “by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or
property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” Id. § 104(a).
125 United States v. O’Brien, 560 U.S. 218, 232-33 (2010) (discussing these substantive changes,
which played a role in the Court’s ruling).
126 An Act to Throttle Criminal Use of Guns, Pub. L. No. 105-386, sec. 1, § 924(c), 112 Stat.
3469, 3469 (1998) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)).
127 508 U.S. 129, 132-33, 137 (1993).
128 First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, sec. 403(a), § 924(c)(1)(C), 132 Stat. 5194, 522122 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C)).

658

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 170: 637

all.129 Treasury again was tasked with enforcement of the Act. As with the
NFA and FFA, enforcement was delegated to the IRS’s Alcohol and Tax
Division, which just a few years after the law “achieved full bureau status as
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms.”130
Like its predecessor gun crime statutes, the 1968 legislation—both the
omnibus bill and the GCA (which are generally collectively referred to as the
GCA131)—generated controversy that reached the Supreme Court.132 Indeed,
the Court has, over the past three decades, ruled on just § 924(c) so many
times that in United States v. O’Brien, ruling that the use of a machine gun was
a sentencing-enhancer that must be proven to the jury, the Court wearily
commented, “[t]he Court must interpret, once again, § 924(c) of Title 18 of
the United States Code.”133 We return to § 924(c) when we draw implications
in Parts II and III.
2. Armed Career Criminal Act (1984)
Faced with increasing crime rates, Congress sought further ways to deter
and punish lawbreakers.134 One way it did so was “to target career criminals
for punishment in light of social scientific research conducted in the 1970s
and 1980s concluding that a relatively small number of habitual offenders are
responsible for a large fraction of crimes.”135 The Armed Career Criminal Act
(“ACCA”) was, in the words of James Jacobs, partly the result of the “lawand-order politics [that] had become firmly entrenched” by the 1980s.136
In 1981, Senator Arlen Specter introduced a bill that would eventually
become the ACCA.137 That bill—the Career Criminal Life Sentence Act of
1981—created a new mandatory life sentence for certain crimes.138 Its main
provision read:

DECONDE, supra note 34, at 186-88.
Hardy, supra note 40, at 604.
Id. at 595.
See Kopel, supra note 45, at 1548-49 (“Because the Federal GCA vastly expanded the scope
of federal gun laws, the federal courts were soon hearing plenty of cases about ‘prohibited persons’
(usually, convicted felons) who had violated federal law by possessing a firearm.”).
133 560 U.S. 218, 221 (2010).
134 See Beale, supra note 44, at 43 (“The 1980s and 1990s brought increased public concern with
violent crime, and Congress responded with the enactment of a number of new federal
offenses . . . .”).
135 James G. Levine, The Armed Career Criminal Act and the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines: Moving
Toward Consistency, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 537, 545 (2009); see also DAVID ALAN SKLANSKY, A
PATTERN OF VIOLENCE: HOW THE LAW CLASSIFIES CRIMES AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR
JUSTICE 75-85 (2021) (detailing the evolution of ACCA).
136 JACOBS, supra note 63, at 26.
137 Levine, supra note 135, at 545.
138 S. 1688, 97th Cong. (1981).
129
130
131
132
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Whoever commits, conspires, or attempts to commit a robbery or a burglary
in violation of the felony statutes of a State or of the United States while
using, threatening to use, displaying or possessing a firearm, after having
been twice convicted of a robbery or a burglary in violation of the felony
statutes of a State or the United States is a career criminal and upon
conviction shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life.139

Specter’s bill would have vastly expanded the reach of federal criminal
law. After criticism about federalizing robbery and burglary crimes, the
proponents of harsher punishment turned to a preexisting jurisdictional
hook—the federal gun crimes.140 The new version “eliminated the creation of
federal jurisdiction over local robberies and burglaries committed by repeat
offenders” and instead “created a sentence enhancement for repeat offenders
convicted of violating a preexisting federal law.”141 As signed into law, the
ACCA amended Title VII of the 1968 legislation.142 It provided that any
person caught unlawfully possessing firearms (e.g., felons) after three prior
robbery or burglary convictions faced a mandatory minimum sentence of 15
years in prison.143 The ACCA took away any judicial discretion, providing:
[T]he court shall not suspend the sentence of, or grant a probationary
sentence to, such person with respect to the conviction under this subsection,
and such person shall not be eligible for parole with respect to the sentence
imposed under this subsection.144

The ACCA was amended two years later in 1986 to substantially expand
its reach.145 Those amendments replaced the qualifying predicate offenses;
instead of robbery or burglary, the predicates became “a violent felony or a
serious drug offense.”146 The statute defined a “violent felony” to include
felonies that (1) had force as an element, (2) were one of several enumerated
crimes—(“burglary, arson, or extortion”) or ones involving explosives, or that
(3) “otherwise involve[] conduct that presents a serious potential risk of
physical injury to another.”147 The last clause became known as the “residual

Id. § 2118(a).
Levine, supra note 135, at 546-47.
Id.
Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2185 (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. § 1202).
143 Id. § 1802.
144 Id.
145 See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 582-83 (1990) (describing the amendment history).
146 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1402, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-39 (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 942).
147 Id. at 3207-40.
139
140
141
142
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clause.”148 With these amendments, Congress covered both “crimes against
the person” and “certain physically risky crimes against property.”149
As one scholar has noted, these provisions were quite popular: “[h]eaping
punishment on those who supplied firearms to violent criminals and drug
traffickers appealed to everyone.”150 The Supreme Court has noted the focus
on recidivism and firearms, observing that “throughout the history of the
enhancement provision, Congress focused its efforts on career offenders—
those who commit a large number of fairly serious crimes as their means of
livelihood, and who, because they possess weapons, present at least a potential
threat of harm to persons.”151
The ACCA has generated a long line of Supreme Court cases considering
how to deal with the predicate felonies. In Taylor v. United States, the Court
concluded that whether a prior conviction counts as an enumerated predicate
(there, as “burglary”) should be determined based on comparing the elements
of the underlying conviction to the “generic” offense.152 The Court in
Descamps v. United States declared that Congress did not want courts looking
to the underlying facts; instead, it “meant ACCA to function as an on-off
switch, directing that a prior crime would qualify as a predicate offense in all
cases or in none.”153
When it came to ACCA’s residual clause, the Court’s inability to draw
clear lines throughout a series of cases led it to eventually scrap the
enterprise.154 In Johnson v. United States, the Court struck down the residual

See Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 594 (2015) (describing the residual clause).
Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 143-44 (2008), abrogated on other grounds by Johnson v.
United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015).
150 JACOBS, supra note 63, at 29.
151 Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 587-88 (1990).
152 Id. at 600. Treatment of the burglary offense has alone prompted several cases. See, e.g.,
Quarles v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1872, 1879 (2019) (holding that for generic burglary, “remainingin burglary . . . occur[s] when the defendant forms the intent to commit a crime at any time while
unlawfully present in a building or structure”); United States v. Stitt, 139 S. Ct. 399, 407 (2018)
(holding that generic burglary includes burglary of a structure or vehicle that has been adapted or is
customarily used for overnight accommodation). But courts cannot rely on police reports to establish
a connection to the generic offense. See Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005) (holding
that the sentencing court making the determination “is limited to the terms of the charging
document, the terms of a plea agreement or transcript of colloquy between judge and defendant in
which the factual basis for the plea was confirmed by the defendant, or to some comparable judicial
record of this information”).
153 570 U.S. 254, 268 (2013).
154 Justice Scalia plainly stated in Derby the Court’s inability to draw clear lines, commenting:
148
149

Since our ACCA cases are incomprehensible to judges, the statute obviously does not
give ‘person[s] of ordinary intelligence fair notice’ of its reach. I would grant certiorari,
declare ACCA’s residual provision to be unconstitutionally vague, and ring down the
curtain on the ACCA farce playing in federal courts throughout the Nation.
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clause as unconstitutionally vague.155 As it said, “this Court’s repeated
attempts and repeated failures to craft a principled and objective standard out
of the residual clause confirm its hopeless indeterminacy.”156
3. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (1986)
As part of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Congress not only enacted
the ACCA, but also empowered the newly created U.S. Sentencing
Commission to develop sentencing guidelines.157 The Sentencing Reform Act
“was passed at a time of soaring crime rates, and during a period when crime
had increasingly become a national political issue.”158 The push for determinate
sentencing guidelines was supported by “both sides of the political aisle.”159
The main gun-related guideline the Commission drafted, and amended in
certain respects since, is U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1.160 As with other guidelines, it
accounts for elements and definitions in key statutes but also seeks consideration
of “real offense” aspects of cases that commonly arise across different charges.161
In general, § 2K2.4 states that unless a person is a career offender, the
sentence for a violation of § 924(c) will be the mandatory minimum, with
other offense-level adjustments not applicable.162 The offense level may
depend on the type of firearm; the number of them; the defendant’s prior
convictions for firearms, ammunition, drug or violent felonies; whether the
person was prohibited from possession as a convict or a noncitizen without
status; or whether the use or possession was in connection with another
offense.163 For example, the guidelines address sentencing enhancement for
Derby v. United States, 564 U.S. 1047, 1049 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (alteration in original)
(citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123 (1979)).
155 576 U.S. 591, 597-98 (2015) (determining the clause is too vague because of its failure to
provide certainty of “the risk posed by a crime” and “about how much risk it takes for a crime to
qualify as a violent felony”).
156 Id. at 598.
157 Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 211, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3551-3586).
158 David E. Patton, Guns, Crime Control, and A Systemic Approach to Federal Sentencing, 32
CARDOZO L. REV. 1427, 1465-66 (2011).
159 Id.
160 See also U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, PRIMER ON FIREARMS OFFENSES 22-38 (2021)
(summarizing offense levels based on presence of certain characteristics).
161 See generally Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon
Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 11-12 (1988) (explaining that the Commission’s approach
combines the “base offense level” with “real” aggravating or mitigating factors).
162 U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.4(b), (c) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
163 Id. at § 2K2.1. Additional, more specialized guidelines deal with “Use of Firearm, ArmorPiercing Ammunition, or Explosive During or in Relation to Certain Crimes.” Id. at § 2K2.4. There
are also specialized guidelines for “Possession of Firearm or Dangerous Weapon in Federal Facility;
Possession or Discharge of Firearm in School Zone” and “Possessing, Purchasing, or Owning Body
Armor by Violent Felons.” Id. at §§ 2K2.5-6.
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felony possession of multiple firearms, increasing the base level of offenses if
a person illegally possesses three or more firearms, with the enhancement
increasing with the number of firearms involved.164 The guidelines also create
enhancements if a defendant trafficked in firearms.165 The Sentencing
Guidelines are advisory following the Supreme Court’s ruling in United States v.
Booker in 2005, but they are still highly relevant in plea bargain negotiations and at
sentencing.166 Substantial case law has interpreted provisions in these guidelines.167
4. Firearms Owners Protection Act (1986)
The Gun Control Act generated controversy among gun-rights
proponents almost from the beginning.168 It led to calls to rein in enforcement
efforts, fix confusion in the law, and protect law-abiding citizens from
becoming “technical” law-breakers.169 An increasingly hardline NRA and its
congressional and grassroots supporters highlighted serious concerns about
aggressive enforcement actions conducted by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
and Firearms (“ATF”).170 ATF’s enforcement “generated intense reaction
from a small but vocal minority of licensed dealers and unlicensed traffickers,
long used to unrestricted trafficking in guns.”171

164 Id. § 2K2.1(b)(1); see also id. at app. 5 (clarifying that lawfully obtained or possessed firearms
do not count towards an enhancement).
165 Id. § 2K2.1(b)(5).
166 543 U.S. 220, 246 (2005); see, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of
Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 878-90 (2009) (discussing the
impact of the post-Booker guidelines on prosecutorial discretion and plea negotiations).
167 See, e.g., Kendall C. Burman, Comment, Firearm Enhancements Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1055, 1055 (2004) (describing the circuit split regarding the meaning
of the companion felony enhancement provision).
168 See SPITZER, supra note 39, at 191 (observing that “[g]un control opponents nevertheless
immediately set to work to erode the [GCA], if not overturn it entirely”). Indeed, President Ford
called for its repeal as part of his 1976 presidential campaign. DECONDE, supra note 34, at 204.
169 See Hardy, supra note 40, at 606-07 (“Beginning in early 1979, Senate hearings publicized a
number of cases of serious abuses of enforcement powers. This documentation was later cited as the
empirical foundation of FOPA.”). These abuses included charging a disabled Vietnam veteran with
possession of an unregistered machine gun despite the lack of any proof that he knew the
characteristics that made the weapon a regulated one, resulting in an apology from the judge, who
directed the verdict for the veteran. Oversight Hearings on Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms:
Hearing of the Comm. on Appropriations, 96th Cong. 20-30 (1979) (recording testimony of David A.
Moorhead). The Congressional Record included the trial transcript of the federal district judge
dismissing the indictments after trial and castigating the government for overzealous enforcement:
“I don’t think this case should have been brought . . . [O]n behalf of the law enforcement officials in
this case, they should have used some common sense and a little compassion and taken all the facts
into consideration.” Id. at 27.
170 See Kopel, supra note 45, at 1566 (describing FOPA as “conceived in the late 1970s and early
1980s as congressional committees recorded horror stories of abusive BATF prosecutions.”).
171 Vizzard, Impact, supra note 36, at 342.
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FOPA made a number of significant modifications to the existing firearms
law tapestry. It systemized treatment of prohibited possessors under § 922,
combining and revising the poorly-structured and inconsistent provisions in
the 1968 legislation.172 It also added a more robust relief from firearm
disabilities process.173 The GCA had prohibited possession for those with
state convictions, even when state law restored one’s civil rights.174 FOPA
changed that175 and expanded the ability of all prohibited possessors to seek
from the Treasury Secretary (and later ATF) relief from that disability.176
FOPA also repealed some of the GCA’s interstate sales provisions,
allowing dealers to sell rifles and shotguns to an out-of-state resident as long
as the sale is legal in both the seller and buyer’s states.177 In one of its few
more restrictive measures, FOPA banned private possession of machine guns
manufactured after 1986.178
Another major set of revisions in FOPA relate to dealers. Indeed, FOPA
might accurately be described as the Firearm Dealers Protection Act.179 The
NRA, other pro-gun interest groups, and gun-friendly legislators ensured

172 See Hardy, supra note 40, at 639 (“Few portions of the Gun Control Act were as garbled as its
core, the definition of ‘prohibited persons’ who were forbidden to acquire, possess or transport firearms.”).
173 See id. at 644 (“FOPA, while retaining review on an ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard uniquely
expanded district court review by allowing the court to admit evidence outside the record . . . .”).
174 See United States v. Ziegenhagen, 420 F. Supp. 72, 74-75 (E.D. Wis. 1976) (holding that the
possession ban applied and stating “[t]he purpose of the statutes . . . would be emasculated if every
person receiving a restoration of civil rights after completing a state sentence were deemed not to
have been convicted within the meaning of these federal laws.”).
175 Firearms Owners’ Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, sec. 101, § 921(a)(20)(B), 100 Stat.
449, 450 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 921) (“What constitutes a conviction of such a
crime shall be determined in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings
were held.”).
176 See id. sec. 105, § 925(c), 100 Stat. at 459 (amending Section 925 of the code “by inserting
‘Any person whose application for relief from disabilities is denied by the Secretary may file a
petition with the United States district court . . . for a judicial review of such denial.”); see also
Pannal Alan Sanders, United States v. Bean: Shoveling After the Elephant?, 35 ST. MARY’S L.J. 555,
564-65 (2004) (explaining that the amendment removed the limitations that made only certain
felons eligible); United States v. Bean, 537 U.S. 71, 74 (2002) (noting that the Treasury Secretary
delegated to ATF the authority to act on applications).
177 See Firearms Owners’ Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, sec. 102, § 922(b)(A), 100 Stat.
449, 451 (amending Section 922 of title 18 to make it inapplicable to these sales).
178 Id. sec. 102, § 922(o)(1), (2), 100 Stat. at 453 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(o)). This addition
to the bill “was raised with only minutes left in the time allotted [for floor debate] under the rule”
and was “passed on a rather irregular voice vote.” Hardy, supra note 40, at 625.
179 See Vizzard, Current and Future Policy, supra note 34, at 882-83 (explaining that “[a]mong
the most significant changes” FOPA made to the existing federal framework were a series of changes
affecting dealers); Anthony A. Braga, More Gun Laws or More Gun Law Enforcement?, 20 J. POL’Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 545, 547 (2001) (explaining that FOPA, combined with NRA influence, makes
dealer prosecutions more difficult).
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that FOPA would make enforcement against dealers more difficult.180 A
number of FOPA’s provisions reflect this difficulty.
The Act provided a definition of “engaged in the business” of firearm
sales, manufacturing, and repairs that made lots of occasional sellers no longer
covered by the requirement to obtain a license. Only those “who devote[]
time, attention, and labor to dealing in firearms as a regular course of trade
or business with the principal objective of livelihood and profit through the
repetitive purchase and resale of firearms” had to be licensed as dealers.181
Other provisions had similar deregulatory effect, including (1) curtailing ATF’s
rulemaking authority because of concerns over how it had been used with respect
to dealers,182 (2) raising the scienter requirement for dealer violations,183 (3)
restricting ATF’s ability to police dealers,184 and (4) limiting ATF’s authority to
acquire licensee records.185 In short, as historian Alexander DeConde put it, “the
act gutted the already feeble federal firearms regulation.”186
FOPA also modified the firearm sentence enhancements. In addition to
Title VII of the 1968 legislation, FOPA recodified ACCA into 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e), bringing most major firearm crimes into one chapter of the U.S.
Code.187 Substantively, FOPA slightly changed ACCA’s definition of burglary
and expanded § 924(c)’s sentence enhancement.188 It provided extra
enhancements for the use of machine guns or silencers.189

180 See SPITZER, supra note 39, at 191 (noting that the NRA was “joined by the Gun Owners
of America and the Citizens Committee for the Right to Keep and Bear Arms” in lobbying for
FOPA’s changes).
181 Firearms Owners’ Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, sec. 101, § 921(a)(21)(C), 100 Stat. 449, 450.
182 See Hardy, supra note 40, at 618-20 (explaining that the final version of the bill limited the
record-submission power that provided the Treasury with the rulemaking power to make regulations).
183 Hardy describes the increase in the scienter requirement for dealer violations, stating:

After negotiations in which Treasury argued that it ought not to be required to prove
intent to violate the law for serious offenses such as possession of stolen weapons,
felon in possession and illegal importation, a bifurcation was drafted under which
these offenses needed proof only of a ‘knowing’ violation, while the remainder still
required proof of willfulness.
Id. at 647-48
184 See id. at 617-18 (“The NRA’s core concern had been to prevent the use of inspections to
harass dealers or to drum up technical cases by ‘fishing expeditions.’”).
185 Id. at 655-56; Firearms Owners’ Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, sec. 101,
§ 921(a)(21)(C), 100 Stat. 449, 453 (1986).
186 DECONDE, supra note 34, at 230.
187 Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2185 (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. § 1201); Firearms Owners’ Protection Act, sec. 101, § 921(a)(21)(C), 100 Stat. at 458.
188 Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 582 (1990) (“The definition of burglary was amended
slightly, by replacing the words ‘any felony’ with ‘any crime punishable by a term of imprisonment
exceeding one year and . . . .’”).
189 Firearms Owners’ Protection Act, sec. 104(a)(2)(D), (E), § 924(c), 100 Stat. at 456-57.
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In sum, “FOPA’s impact on enforcement and administration of the federal
firearms laws is wide-ranging.”190 But those impacts are uneven. Dealers and
potential dealers get a break; offenders or potential offenders get another
book thrown at them. Thus, while FOPA “generally tightens standards for
record inspection and disposition, firearm seizures and forfeitures, license
revocations and general criminal penalties,” it simultaneously “expand[s]
mandatory sentencing for use of firearms in” certain offenses.191
C. Toward Modern Regulatory Approaches
On January 17, 1989, a 24-year old white supremacist killed five students
and one teacher at an elementary school in Stockton, California and injured
33 more.192 The shooter, who had a criminal record, used an AK-47 in the
attack.193 One historian has observed how the Stockton shooting “denoted a
marked change in the public reaction to civilian gun violence.”194 This tragic
event helped pave the way for the next major set of gun regulations, which
focused on the offender and his weapons.
1. The Brady Act (1993)
During John Hinckley’s assassination attempt on President Reagan in
1981, Hinckley gravely injured Reagan’s press secretary James Brady.
Following this incident, James and his wife Sarah became active supporters
of more stringent regulation of firearms.195 To that end, Sarah Brady became
involved with one of the largest pro-regulation organizations, Handgun
Control Inc.; she was elected to the Board in 1985 and took over as Chair in
1989,196 where she “stimulated fund-raising, kept the organization focused on
what she saw as the need for more effective federal gun regulation, and
initiated fresh, aggressive tactics against the gun lobby.”197

Id. at 653-54.
Id.
DECONDE, supra note 34, at 237.
Id.
Id.
See Kopel, supra note 45, at 1574-75 (“Brady threw herself into the movement that her
husband would later join as well. Eventually, the organization would bear her name . . . . As
Republican insiders, the Bradys offered the possibility of taking the gun control message to the
Republican establishment.”).
196 History
of Brady, B RADY U NITED , https://www.bradyunited.org/history
[https://perma.cc/V7SP-MUNL].
197 DECONDE, supra note 34, at 241.
190
191
192
193
194
195
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One major focus became a push for a waiting period on handgun
purchases.198 The legislation’s goal was twofold: first, it sought to allow time for
a background check to assess whether the prospective purchaser was prohibited
from possessing firearms, and second, it looked to create a cooling off period.199
The first version of the Brady bill was introduced in 1987, but it failed to
pass the House.200 That did not stop the effort, and the legislation was reintroduced again in the early 1990s. Although the Brady bill did not receive a
welcome audience in the George H.W. Bush administration,201 it did pick up
other major backers. “[T]he Bradys had persuaded former presidents Nixon,
Ford, and Carter to endorse the gun-control bill,” and “[e]ven Reagan . . .
broke with the gun lobby’s position on this issue” and announced his support.202
As Reagan said in a New York Times op-ed, “[b]ased upon the evidence in states
that already have handgun purchase waiting periods, this bill—on a nationwide
scale—can’t help but stop thousands of illegal handgun purchases.”203 Aided by
this cadre of supporters, the bill started to move in Congress.
The House passed the bill in 1991 over a competing alternative, backed by
the NRA, that would have eliminated the waiting period and instead
instituted an instant background check.204 “The problem with such a proposal
at the time was that successful operation of such a system required that
pertinent records from all the states be fully automated.”205 That was far from
a reality. In the Senate, the bill was modified and attached to an omnibus
crime bill that had divided the chambers throughout the year.206 A conference
committee tried to hash out a compromise between the House and Senate

198 See James B. Jacobs & Kimberly A. Potter, Keeping Guns Out of the “Wrong” Hands: The Brady
Law and the Limits of Regulation, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 93, 97 (1995) (“Gun control
advocates proposed a waiting period and a background check . . . .”); see also SPITZER, supra note 39,
at 202 (“From 1987 to 1993, gun control proponents placed their primary emphasis on the enactment
of a national waiting period for handgun purchases.”).
199 See SPITZER, supra note 39, at 202 (explaining these twin aims).
200 See id. (“The Brady bill was introduced in early 1987 . . . . [But] opponents led by the NRA
succeeded in defeating the bill . . . .”).
201 DECONDE, supra note 34, at 242 (noting that President Bush stood firm on the gun issue
and threatened to veto the bill).
202 Id.
203 Ronald Reagan, Why I’m for the Brady Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1991, at A23.
204 See SPITZER, supra note 39, at 203 (explaining that the NRA bill would have eliminated
one of the Brady bill’s aims of creating a cooling-off period but still barred ineligible buyers from
purchasing handguns).
205 Id. at 203; see also Marc Christopher Cozzolino, Gun Control: The Brady Handgun Violence
Prevention Act, 16 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 245, 256-57 (1992) (chronicling the practical objections to
the alternative option, including time and cost constraints).
206 See SPITZER, supra note 39, at 203 (“A conference version was hammered out in November
that rolled the Brady provision . . . and a compromise crime bill together . . . .).
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versions, but, though that compromise received House support, the resulting
bill was filibustered in the Senate.207
The Brady bill would come back again after the 1992 election. During that
election, the NRA refused to support Bush for reelection even though
Clinton ran on a platform that embraced stricter gun regulation, including
support for the Brady bill.208 On the campaign trail and in office, Clinton
talked about firearms like other politicians; “[h]e persisted in identifying the
gun problem primarily with crime.”209 Once in office, Clinton used his
popularity to push for these new laws. And his allies in Congress were happy
to oblige, introducing the Brady bill again less than a month after Clinton
assumed office.210
The bill retained a five-business-day waiting period for handgun
purchases, but the House agreed to an amendment to eliminate the waiting
period after five years.211 In the Senate, however, the prospect of another
filibuster loomed.212 But, “sensing a rising tide of impatience and the inability
to win further concessions from Democratic leaders,” Republican legislators
backed down and the measure passed the Senate.213 President Clinton signed
it into law on November 30, 1993, after “[t]he NRA put up a token effort to
stop it, but focused primarily on influencing the final law through
amendments.”214 “Ultimately, after seven years of struggle, intensive lobbying
by organizations such as Handgun Control Inc., and mounting resentment
against the tactics of the gun lobby, control proponents cracked the opposition
to the Brady bill.”215
The law modified several aspects of prior firearms legislation, including
most prominently imposing the temporary waiting period.216 It also required
dealers to verify a buyer’s identity and transmit the buyer’s information to

207 See id. (“The Senate finally brought the compromise bill to the floor for a vote . . ., but
Republicans used the unique Senate device of the filibuster . . . to force bill sponsors to withdraw
the measure after a vote to end debate . . . .”).
208 See DECONDE, supra note 34, at 245-46 (“Still incensed by [Bush’s] stance on assault guns,
the rifle association refused to contribute to his campaign or to endorse him again. It took this
position even though . . . Clinton . . . posed a greater danger to the association’s doctrines.”).
209 See id. at 250.
210 Id. at 249.
211 See SPITZER, supra note 39, at 204 (“The Brady bill struggle climaxed in 1993 when
supporters promoted a five-business-day waiting period . . . . One such amendment, to phase out
the waiting period after five years, was adopted.”).
212 Id. at 204 (“The bill faced a Republican filibuster almost immediately . . . .”).
213 Id. at 205; see also Adam Clymer, How Jockeying Brought Brady Bill Back to Life, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 22, 1993, at B8 (describing the negotiations that led to the passage of the Brady bill).
214 Kopel, supra note 45, at 1582.
215 DECONDE, supra note 34, at 250-51.
216 See generally Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536,
1536-37 (1993) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
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the chief law enforcement officer (“CLEO”) of the jurisdiction.217 CLEOs
were then required to make a “reasonable effort” to determine in five days
whether the transfer would violate the law.218 In Printz v. United States, the
Supreme Court struck down these temporary Brady provisions as an
unconstitutional commandeering of state executive power.219
In its most lasting legacy, the law required the Attorney General to
establish a national instant background-check system within the five years
during which the temporary waiting period was in effect.220 Pursuant to that
directive, and under delegation from the Attorney General, the FBI launched
the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (“NICS”) in late
1998 to conduct automated background checks on all firearms sales—not just
handgun sales—by licensed gun dealers. By 1999, the Department of Justice
called NICS “highly effective in stopping the illegal flow of firearms from
federally licensed gun dealers to prohibited persons.”221 During its first
twenty-four months of operation, “the system processed over seventeen
million inquiries and prevented over 300,000 felons, fugitives, and other
prohibited persons from receiving firearms from federally licensed dealers.”222
2. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994
The same pro-regulation forces that passed the Brady bill continued to
push for more stringent regulations. The 1994 crime bill was a result of this
effort. The bill, formally known as the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, reflects an increasing agreement on tough-on-

Id.
Id. at 1537-38. There was not much clarity, however, on what this requirement obligated
CLEOs to do. See Jacobs & Potter, supra note 198, at 99 (“On its face, this law could mean an effort
as cursory as checking local criminal records or as comprehensive as making inquiries of federal,
state, local, and private institutions and agencies responsible for dealing with crime, mental health,
immigration, and drugs.”).
219 The Court in Printz describing the practice and holding it unconstitutional stated:
217
218

[T]he central obligation imposed upon CLEOs by the interim provisions of the Brady
Act—the obligation to ‘make a reasonable effort to ascertain within 5 business days
whether receipt or possession [of a handgun] would be in violation of the law,
including research in whatever State and local recordkeeping systems are available and
in a national system designated by the Attorney General,’ . . . is unconstitutional.
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997).
220 See Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, supra note 216, at 1541 (“Not later than 60
months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Attorney General shall establish a national
instant criminal background check system . . . .”).
221 U.S. D EP ’ T OF J UST ., G UN V IOLENCE R EDUCTION : N ATIONAL I NTEGRATED
F IREARMS V IOLENCE R EDUCTION S TRATEGY § 4 (1999) [hereinafter DOJ Strategy],
https://www.justice.gov/archive/opd/Strategy.htm [https://perma.cc/SRB8-G23W].
222 Id.
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crime politics.223 As one scholar noted at the time, the liberal-conservative
divide that marked differing approaches to crime in the 1960s (root cause
focus vs. harsh punishment) had “largely disappeared” by the 1990s.224 By
then, “measures emphasizing punishment far overshadow[ed] any
consideration of crime prevention” and “[b]oth conservatives and liberals
attempt[ed] to outdo each other in their posturing and proposals to be
increasingly punitive toward criminals.”225
The Senate passed its version of the crime bill in November 1993, around
the same time the Brady bill passed the Senate.226 It took the House until
April 1994 to pass its own crime bill, and the resulting legislation that
emerged from conference committee passed both chambers in August 1994.227
Clinton signed it into law the next month.228
Title XI of the Act included a host of new gun regulations. First, it
contained the Public Safety and Recreational Firearm Use Protection Act,
also known as the assault weapons ban.229 The law banned specific firearms
by name, gave the ATF authority to ban other models, and banned semiautomatic rifles with at least two enumerated features.230 It also banned
magazines that could hold more than ten rounds. But the Act grandfathered
in all then-legally owned weapons and magazines. “Not surprisingly, there
was a huge increase in sales in the year before the ban became effective.”231
The ban contained a sunset clause, repealing the provisions ten years after its
effective date.232 Congress did not renew the ban in 2004.233
Second, Title XI also contained the Youth Handgun Safety Act.234 The
provision prohibits the possession of handguns or handgun ammunition by
anyone under age 18.235 Any juvenile violating the provision or person
knowingly providing a handgun to a juvenile faced up to a year of
imprisonment.236 But the Act provided criminal sanctions of up to ten years
223 See generally Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
224 Tony G. Poveda, Clinton, Crime, and the Justice Department, 21 SOC. JUST. 73, 73 (1994).
225 Id.
226 Id. at 73-74.
227 Id.
228 See Kopel, supra note 45, at 1585.
229 Public Safety and Recreational Firearms Use Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat.
1996 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
230 JACOBS, supra note 63, at 31.
231 Id. at 32.
232 Public Safety and Recreational Firearms Use Protection Act § 110105.
233 Assault Weapon Ban Expires, CBS NEWS (Sept. 13, 2004, 9:42 AM), https://
www.cbsnews.com/news/assault-weapon-ban-expires [https://perma.cc/YR7L-5PUH].
234 Public Safety and Recreational Firearms Use Protection Act § 110201.
235 Id.
236 Id.
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in prison for anyone providing the juvenile a gun “knowing or having
reasonable cause to know that the juvenile intended to carry or otherwise
possess or discharge or otherwise use the handgun or ammunition in the
commission of a crime of violence.”237
Third, the law created a new category of prohibited persons.238 It
prohibited individuals subject to an order that restrained them from
“harassing, stalking, or threatening” an intimate partner or child of their
intimate partner from possessing guns if the order met specific
requirements.239 As David Kopel notes, this “was a measure that the NRA
had not resisted.”240
The law also created several firearm-related sentence enhancements. It
directed the Sentencing Commission “to provide an appropriate
enhancement of the punishment” if a crime of violence or drug-trafficking
crime was committed with any semi-automatic firearm (not just a semiautomatic banned as an assault weapon).241 It did the same for anyone
convicted of a counterfeiting or forgery crime if the defendant “used or
carried a firearm . . . during and in relation to the felony.”242 It also required
an enhancement for anyone convicted under 922(g) if the person had a prior
violent felony or serious drug-offense conviction.243
The law was also notable for what it did not include. Senator Alfonse
D’Amato introduced a provision that would make it a federal crime to engage
in any crime using a handgun that had travelled in interstate commerce,
potentially covering 900,000 offenses annually, which engendered
noteworthy opposition from the Chief Justice and the Judicial Conference of
the United States, as Sara Sun Beale has described.244 The amendment was
passed by both the House and the Senate, but was omitted in conference.245
Chief Justice William Rehnquist repeatedly spoke out against the amendment
as “inconsistent with long-accepted concepts of federalism” and as an approach
that would have “overburdened” federal courts and “swamped” prosecutors.246

Id.
Id. at § 110,401.
The order had to be issued after a hearing in which the person had actual notice and an
opportunity to participate. It also must have either contained a finding that the person was a threat
to the intimate partner or child, or it expressly prohibited use or threats of force. Id.
240 Kopel, supra note 45, at 1586.
241 Public Safety and Recreational Firearms Use Protection Act § 110,501.
242 Id. at § 110,512.
243 Id. at § 110,513.
244 See Beale, supra note 35, at 1649-51 (detailing D’Amato’s proposal and criticisms of it).
245 Id. at 1650.
246 Id. at 1650-51 (quoting William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice’s 1991 Year-End Report on the
Federal Judiciary, Jan. 1992, 1-3, and 140 CONG. REC. 11, 177-78 (1994)).
237
238
239
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3. The NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007
The NICS Improvement Act of 2007 was designed to enhance the NICS
system’s access to state criminal records and records concerning persons
prohibited from receiving firearms due to mental illness.247 It was primarily
motivated by the April 16, 2007 shooting at Virginia Tech, in which a student
with a history of mental illness was able to purchase two firearms, with which
he shot to death thirty-two students and faculty members, wounded
seventeen more, and then took his own life.248 In the Act’s findings section,
Congress explained that this shooting “renewed the need to improve
information-sharing that would enable Federal and State law enforcement
agencies to conduct complete background checks on potential firearms
purchasers.”249 The Act incentivizes state sharing of information to the NICS
by offering new grant programs for state executive and judicial agencies to
improve information available to the NICS.250 It also provides for penalties
for states that do not comply with the Act’s record completeness goals.251
Following initial opposition raising concerns about both gun rights and
privacy rights, as well as the law’s impact on veterans, lawmakers amended
the statute—and ultimately, the NRA supported the Act.252 In June, when the
Act passed the House, the NRA explained its support for using NICS to
screen “those who have been adjudicated mentally incompetent.”253 It also
explained its support for the Act’s removal of prohibitions of persons who
have been relieved of adjudications of mental illness.254 The Act would help
restore gun rights for veterans and others who were prohibited from
purchasing firearms under the Brady Act.255 Finally, the legislation ensured
there would be no tax or fee associated with obtaining a NICS check.256

247 See NICS Act Record Improvement Program, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS.,
https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=49 [https://perma.cc/ZK47-BT6M] (explaining the
purpose and context of the Act).
248 See NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007, 121 Stat. 2559, 2560 (2008).
249 Id.
250 Id. at 2567, 2571.
251 Id. A state must also certify, to the satisfaction of the Attorney General, that the state has
implemented a program permitting persons who have been adjudicated as having a mental defect or
committed to a mental institution to obtain relief from the firearms disabilities as a result of such
adjudication or commitment. Id. at § 101(c)(2)(A)(i).
252 ‘NICS Improvement Amendments Act’ Not Gun Control!, NRA INST. FOR LEGAL ACTION
(Jun. 23, 2007), https://www.nraila.org/articles/20070623/nics-improvement-amendments-act-not-g
[https://perma.cc/HVD9-XT86]; James Jacobs & Jennifer Jones, Keeping Firearms Out of the Hands
of the Dangerously Mentally Ill, 47 No. 3 CRIM. L. BULL. Art. 2, 402-03, 404 (2011).
253 ‘NICS Improvement Amendments Act’ Not Gun Control!, supra note 252.
254 Id.
255 Id.
256 Id.
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The states have lagged considerably in updating records in the NICS
system,257 despite the potential grant program penalties for noncompliance.
In 2011, Lindsey Lewis presented data that paints a stark picture of the lag in
updated state records:
At the end of 2005, the NICS had over 234,000 records for people with
disqualifying mental health histories. Yet in January 2006, there was an
estimated 2.7 million people who had been involuntarily committed for
mental health disorders. And as of April 2007, only 22 states contributed any
mental health records to the NICS. . . . This means prohibited individuals
are still able to buy guns without being caught by the NICS.258

The federal government has not forcefully responded to this
noncompliance—the penalties under the Act have never been enforced.259
*

*

*

The vast array of federal firearm offenses, from the initial strict regulation
of highly dangerous and unusual weapons to the increasingly punitive
approach to use and possession offenses, display a number of significant
features that we explore in the next two Parts.
II. FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT OF GUN OFFENSES
We described the evolution of a wide range of criminal gun offenses in
Part I, including offenses designed to regulate manufacturing and
distribution, limit possession, and require registration and tracking of
firearms purchases. Yet federal enforcement has focused largely on three
offenses: (1) § 922(g)(1) (felon possession); (2) § 924(c) (gun use during a
crime); and (3) § 924(e) (ACCA). Moreover, as we describe in this Part, such
enforcement has increased, as has sentence length, over the past four decades.
This Part explores what accounts for the changing federal firearms prosecution
dynamic by presenting data concerning federal firearms charging and sentencing,
examining policy positions taken by federal enforcers, and describing the rise of
the current task-force-based model for federal firearms enforcement.
257 Cf. NICS PARTICIPATION MAP, FBI (July 2019), https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/nicsparticipation-map.pdf [https://perma.cc/8GAD-86GG] (showing state by state participation in the
National Instant Criminal Background Check System).
258 Lindsey Lewis, Mental Illness, Propensity for Violence, and the Gun Control Act, 11 HOUS. J.
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 149, 162-63 (2011).
259 See Alyssa Dale O’Donnell, Monsters, Myths, and Mental Illness: A Two-Step Approach to
Reducing Gun Violence in the United States, 25 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 475, 500 (2016) (“[T]hese
penalties have never been enforced. It is impossible to intimidate states into meeting compliance
requirements if they know that realistically they will face no consequences for failure to do so.”).
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A. Data on Federal Gun Prosecutions
We examine first the data from the Administrative Office of the Courts
(“AOC”) regarding federal gun prosecutions. The data we extract and present
here represents the most comprehensive picture of how the federal
government has treated gun crime since 1942, however it also has certain
limitations due to changes in reporting over time.260 Analyzing these data
does allow us to observe longer-term trends and draw certain conclusions
about the coherence and cohesiveness of the federal government’s approach
to firearms crimes, a theme we return to in Part III. We first present data on
firearms charges and then place these trends in context. Figure 1 shows the
number of cases commenced for federal gun crimes in absolute numbers and
as a percentage of all federal criminal cases from 1942 to 2011. In 2012, the
AOC stopped reporting case commencements by offense, and for that reason,
Figure 2 reports the number of defendants charged with such crimes from
2012 to 2019.

260 Starting 1976, the AOC stated that changes in reporting required by the Speedy Trial Act
made the data from that year onward “not directly comparable” to criminal statistics published in
previous years. See ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF
THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 77, 225-26 (1976) (describing
the new district court criminal data collection system implemented in October 1975). In 2005, the
AOC changed its offense classification system for reporting statistics, just regarding petty offenses,
and thus cautions that pre- and post-2005 offense data are not comparable, since totals regarding
petty offenses changed. ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., 2005 JUDICIAL BUSINESS: ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 23 (2005). The second change affected the inclusion of any petty
offenses within the firearms category. Despite these two caveats, we think the complete picture
demonstrates longer-term trends, which are also consistent with statements by enforcers, Sentencing
Commission reporting, and analyses from other experts. See, e.g., EMILY TIRY, KELLY ROBERTS
FREEMAN & WILLIAM ADAMS, URB. INST., PROSECUTION OF FEDERAL FIREARMS OFFENSES
2000-16 (2021), https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/bjs/grants/254520.pdf [https://perma.cc/7BZDFRSS] (describing trends in federal prosecutions of firearms offenses from 2000 to 2016);
LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD & MARIANNE W. ZAWITZ, U.S. DEP’T JUST., WEAPONS OFFENSES
AND OFFENDERS (1995) (detailing trends in state and federal weapons-related prosecutions from
1965 through 1993).
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FIGURE 1: FEDERAL GUN CRIME CASES COMMENCED (1942–2011)261
16.00%

10,000
9,000
8,000
7,000
6,000
5,000
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
0

14.00%
12.00%
10.00%
8.00%
6.00%
4.00%
2.00%

# of Gun Cases

2010

2006

2002

1998

1994

1990

1986

1982

1978

1974

1970

1966

1962

1958

1954

1950

1946

1942

0.00%

% Gun Cases of Total Cases

FIGURE 2: FEDERAL GUN CRIME DEFENDANTS COMMENCED (2012–2020)262
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As one would expect from the structure and enforcement mechanism of
the early firearms acts, few prosecutions were brought for violation of these
laws. Even though the laws prohibited possession without registration of
261
262

Source data on file with author.
Source data on file with author.
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certain types of especially dangerous weapons, and all but forbid firearm
possession for violent felons, the crimes were apparently not an important
federal law enforcement priority.263
With the GCA’s enactment in 1968, things began to gradually change.264
Consider that more firearms charges were brought in just one year, 1975, than
in the entire twenty-year period from 1945 to 1965.265 Even when
enforcement picked up following the GCA, scholars estimate DOJ was
declining to prosecute approximately 40% of referrals from ATF, more than
almost any other agency.266 Part of this may have been due to societal
attitudes. As Robert Rabin notes, “in many types of cases prosecution may
stir up either intense local sentiment against attaching a criminal label to the
activity in question, or strong personal sympathy for the type of defendant caught
in the meshes of the criminal system, making it extremely difficult to obtain a
conviction.”267 This was almost certainly true for some violations of gun laws.
Prosecutions started to decline in the late 1970s, likely due in part to highprofile negative scrutiny of ATF enforcement actions,268 leading to a plateau
during much of the Reagan administration. Beginning in the 1990s,
prosecutions increased and continued in an upward, if not linear, progression.
As Sara Sun Beale notes, as federal drug prosecutions increased by the early
1990s, “[f]irearms prosecutions also quadrupled, from 931 prosecutions in
1980 to 3,917 in 1992.”269 No doubt this reflects increased resource allocation
to these efforts. ATF, though itself often under siege, “received a 299 percent
increase in its budget and a 20 percent increase in the number of positions”
from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s.270 During this same time period, the
number of federal prosecutors nearly tripled.271
By the late 1990s, federal enforcers innovated new methods to coordinate
and enforce firearms statutes to reduce gun violence. Some were
technological. The federal government began creating and investing in a new
National Integrated Ballistics Information Network (NIBIN) designed to
See supra fig.1 (showing small numbers of prosecutions).
Vizzard, Gun Control Act, supra note 94, at 87-88.
See supra fig.1. During the twenty-year period from 1945-1965, federal prosecutors brought
2,981 firearms cases. In 1975 alone, they brought 3,165.
266 See Robert L. Rabin, Agency Criminal Referrals in the Federal System: An Empirical Study of
Prosecutorial Discretion, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1036, 1091 (1972) (estimating DOJ declination rates for
federal-agency criminal referrals).
267 Id. at 1055.
268 See, e.g., Kopel, supra note 45, at 1566 (“FOPA . . . was conceived in the late 1970s and early
1980s as congressional committees recorded horror stories of abusive BATF prosecutions.”).
269 Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Principles to Define the Proper Limits for
Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 979, 984 (1995); see also supra fig.1.
270 Beale, supra note 44, at 44.
271 Id. at 45 (noting an increase from approximately 3,000 to more than 8,000 prosecutors in
U.S. Attorneys’ Offices between the mid-1970s and 1990s).
263
264
265
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create a national database of images from bullet and cartridge casings
intended to better link spent ammunition recovered from crime scenes to
firearms.272 By the late 1990s, new funds supported hiring additional ATF
officers and federal investigators.273
In the early 2000s, during the George W. Bush administration, federal
weapons prosecutions initially rose, but then declined during the latter half
of the Bush presidency. This trend of decreasing prosecution continued
throughout the Obama Administration, before reversing during the Trump
Administration.274 This is not necessarily the pattern one might expect, given
the Bush and Trump Administrations’ support for gun rights and the Obama
Administration’s support for gun regulations,275 but it may reflect attitudes
towards aggressive use of federal criminal prosecutions for a variety of other
non-firearm related goals.
Despite the welter of different firearms statutes described in Part I, what
particularly stands out is that the most common charge, accounting for nearly
two-thirds of cases, is the bread and butter felon-in-possession statute.276
Indeed, for the past decade, just two charges—922(g) (possession by
prohibited persons) and 924(c) (furtherance of violent/drug trafficking
crimes)—alone have accounted for more than 80% of all federal firearm

272 See National Integrated Ballistic Information Network (NIBIN), ATF (June 7, 2019),
https://www.atf.gov/firearms/national-integrated-ballistic-information-network-nibin
[https://perma.cc/2934-R4BK].
273 See Daniel C. Richman, “Project Exile” and The Allocation of Federal Law Enforcement
Authority, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 369, 388-89 (2001).
274 See Federal Weapons Prosecutions Continue to Climb in 2019, TRAC REPS. (June 5, 2019),
https://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/560 [https://perma.cc/95QW-QJD9] (depicting firearms
prosecution trends).
275 See FACT SHEET: New Executive Actions to Reduce Gun Violence and Make Our Communities
Safer, OBAMA WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 4, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2016/01/04/fact-sheet-new-executive-actions-reduce-gun-violence-and-make-our
[https://perma.cc/KV34-DEMJ] (describing the Obama administration’s commitment to act against gun
violence through gun reform); Elizabeth Thomas, A Timeline of Trump’s Record on Gun Control
Reform, ABC NEWS (Aug. 5, 2019, 2:45 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/timeline-trumpsrecord-gun-control-reform/story?id=64783662 [https://perma.cc/T7T7-3S2Y] (describing the
Trump administration’s control reform history).
276 Technically, the 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) category contains unlawful possession charges no matter
the underlying reason for disqualification, but the overwhelming majority of unlawful possession
charges are predicated on felony status. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, QUICK FACTS: FELON IN
POSSESSION OF A FIREARM 1 (2021) (stating that felony conviction is the “most common[]”
disqualification under 922(g)).
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charges, as Figure 3 shows.277 The lead investigative agency for these
prosecutions has been ATF.278
FIGURE 3: PERCENTAGE
COMMENCED (2010–2021)279
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Also noteworthy is the relative importance of firearms crimes in relation
to other federal crimes, as Figure 2 displays, showing the steadily growing
share of federal criminal prosecutions. Firearms prosecutions have steadily
grown in number over the past decade (particularly since 2015), reaching over
6,000 cases per year.280 In contrast, drug cases have modestly declined (to
about 20,000 cases per year), fraud cases have declined (from almost 9,000 to
about 6,000 cases), while immigration cases have dramatically increased in

277 See ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 2019 tbl.D-2 (2019) (providing
firearms offense data from 2015 to 2019); see also ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 2014
tbl.D-2 (2014) (providing firearms offense data from 2010-2014).
278 See Beale, supra note 44 at 44 (noting that the “key criminal investigative agencies” included
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms); see also Rabin, supra note 266, at 1054-55 (describing
and cataloging agency referrals, including from ATF).
279 Source data on file with author.
280 See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, FISCAL YEAR 2018: OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL
CASES 5, 7 (2019) (describing recent prosecutorial trends).
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number.281 Changes in federal enforcement approaches shed light on why
these trends can be observed, and also suggest that firearms prosecutions have
played a role in the accompanying the rise in immigration cases.
B. Collaborative Enforcement
In contrast to those federal statistics, which demonstrate rising numbers
of federal prosecutions, longer sentences, and generally suggest a more
punitive federal role, some of the most effective enforcement efforts by the
late 1990s were collaborative federal, state, and local (and sometimes also
public/private) partnerships designed to reduce youth and gang violence.282
Since the 1990s, these efforts “resulted in a ten-fold increase in the number
of federal felon-in-possession prisoners at a cost of several billion dollars.”283 As
David Patton observes, “the stated reason for the federalization of gun cases was,
and remains, stiff federal sentences in the name of reducing violent crime.”284
Our focus in this Article is on the trajectory of federal firearms crimes. Yet
state firearms crime enforcement has also shifted over the past few decades.
Many state offenses have long involved conduct that included possession of
firearms.285 All states and the District of Columbia have statutes regarding
carrying firearms, and all have criminal laws concerning possession, use, sales,
and trafficking of firearms, just as the federal government does.286 Relying
upon FBI data, the Bureau of Justice Statistics reports that arrest rates for
such firearms offenses more than doubled in the three decades after 1965, with
arrests concentrated in urban areas, arrest rates rising dramatically for
teenage males, and arrest rates five times greater for Black than White
persons.287 Nor is the move towards harsher sentencing exclusively federal.
In the 1980s, average weapons sentences were higher for state prisoners;
however, by the 1990s, as revisions to the sentencing guidelines took effect,
they were much higher for federal cases.288 By the mid-1990s, most states had
281 See id. (noting the dramatic increase in immigration prosecutions in fiscal year 2018, when
“[t]he 23,883 immigration cases represented a 16.5 percent increase from the 20,496 cases reported
in fiscal year 2017,” and that almost 43% of federal defendants were noncitizens).
282 See DOJ STRATEGY, supra note 221, at 2 (“In response to the President’s directive, the
Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General directed all U.S. Attorneys and ATF Field
Division Directors jointly to develop locally coordinated gun violence reduction strategies in each
of the 94 federal judicial districts across the United States.”).
283 Patton, supra note 158, at 1429-30.
284 Id. at 1430.
285 C AROLINE W OLF H ARLOW , B UREAU OF J UST . S TATS ., F IREARMS U SE BY
O FFENDERS 1 (2001).
286 LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD & MARIANNE W. ZAWITZ, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS.,
WEAPONS OFFENSES AND OFFENDERS 1 (1995).
287 See id. at 2-3 (graphing these statistics).
288 See id. at 5 (comparing federal and state sentence lengths).
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mandatory minimum sentences for certain weapons offenses.289 While state
court verdicts account for the vast bulk of felony convictions in the U.S.,
which is true for weapons offenses as well, about 10% of felony weapons
convictions occurred in federal court by the mid-1990s (whereas only 4% of
felony convictions in total occurred in federal court).290 Some of these
statutory and sentencing-related changes occurred in tandem between state
and federal lawmakers and enforcers. Some of the shift in the states towards
more severe and aggressive state firearms enforcement can also be accounted
for by federal resources and efforts.291
The modern federal-state-local collaboration formally began in 1991 when
Attorney General Richard Thornburgh “announced the federal initiative
Project Triggerlock, which directed federal prosecutors to work with state and
local authorities to federally prosecute gun possession cases in order to
impose stiffer sentences than state courts would otherwise impose.”292 Its
effects can be seen in data in Figures 1 and 2 from Part II.A, which show an
upward trend beginning in the early 1990s. This represents an almost ten-fold
increase in the two decades after the initiative went into effect.293 The main
driver of the program was increased and consistent prosecution of felon-inpossession cases.294 By 1992, the Justice Department already noted “the
increase in firearms prosecutions resulting from the implementation of
Project Triggerlock,” and stated that as a result “federal prosecutors have been
faced with a variety of legal issues relating to federal firearms law.” 295 But
carrying out this goal of greater enforcement meant “[t]he systematic
involvement of the federal government in prosecuting gun cases that were the
result of local police arrests, and that would have otherwise been prosecuted
in state court.”296 This would raise many questions as such programs expanded
throughout the ensuing decades.

See id. at 6 (“41 States have mandatory minimum sentences to prison for certain weapons offenses.”).
Id. at 5; see also id. at 6 (“[I]n 1991 an estimated 12,700 weapons offenders were in State
prisons, and 3,100 were in Federal prisons”).
291 See, e.g., id. at 6 (noting the use of increased penalties for gun use in a crime at both the
state and federal level).
292 Patton, supra note 158, at 1440.
293 See infra Section II.A figs. 1 & 2; see also David E. Patton, Criminal Justice Reform and Guns:
The Irresistible Movement Meets the Immovable Object, 69 EMORY L.J. 1011, 1012 (2020) (“In the first
twenty years after Thornburgh’s announcement, the number of people serving time in federal prison
for weapons possession jumped dramatically, a nearly tenfold increase from approximately 3,400
(5.8% of all federal prisoners) in 1990 to over 32,000 (15.1% of all federal prisoners) in 2011.”).
294 Id.
295 U.S. D EP ’ T OF J UST ., C RIMINAL R ESOURCE M ANUAL , § 1431 (1992),
https://www.justice.gov/archives/jm/criminal-resource-manual-1431-department-memorandumprosecutions-under-922g [https://perma.cc/4ULN-EP7N].
296 Patton, supra note 158, at 1441.
289
290
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In Boston, “Operation Ceasefire” efforts began in 1996 when “researchers
from Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government joined with local federal law
enforcement agencies and prosecutors to begin a focused, deterrence-based
program” to combat youth gun violence.297 The program involved targeted
enforcement against gangs, but also messaging “zero tolerance” for gun
violence, combined with “sessions with targeted offenders, law enforcement
and their community partners—such as, the clergy, youth advocates and job
counselors”—to “use moral suasion and offer access to such things as social
and medical services, jobs, and educational opportunities that provide
alternatives to violence.”298 Thus, police and prosecutors “make clear that
offenders have a choice: they can continue to break the law and face severe
sanctions, or they can turn their lives around, with the help of service
providers.”299 In Boston, these included the “Boston Jobs Project” by the U.S.
Attorney, the Boston Police Commissioner, the District Attorney, and others,
supported by federal funding.300
In 1997, the Department of Justice launched Project Exile in Richmond,
Virginia, funneling gun-related state and local arrests into federal court to get
the “benefit” of harsher federal penalties.301 This occurred “at a time when
Richmond had one of the highest homicide rates in the country.”302 As Dan
Richman observed, the project received bipartisan praise, as well as praise
both from gun-regulation proponent Sarah Brady and the NRA, which
funded educational programs as part of the program in Richmond schools.303
The project involved the allocation of federal resources and prosecutorial
power to support local efforts, raising federalism concerns.304 A federal court,
while dismissing a constitutional challenge to the program, expressed

297 Id. at 1447; see also DAVID M. KENNEDY, DON’T SHOOT: ONE MAN, A STREET
FELLOWSHIP, AND THE END OF VIOLENCE IN INNER-CITY AMERICA 44-75 (2012) (describing
the history and implementation of Boston’s Operation Ceasefire).
298 DOJ STRATEGY, supra note 223.
299 Id.
300 Id.
301 See Jeffrey Fagan, Policing Guns and Youth Violence, THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN,
Summer/Fall 2002 135 tbl.1 (describing various police approaches across the country that were aimed
at curbing, inter alia, gun violence).
302 Patton, supra note 158, at 1447.
303 See Richman, supra note 273, at 372-73 (describing the praise received from various
individuals and entities); see also Patton, supra note 158, at 1448 (“[Project Exile] was touted at the
time as a tremendous success and received bipartisan praise.”).
304 See Richman, supra note 273, at 411 (“[T]he legacy of Project Exile . . . may be a serious
challenge to the idea of federal enforcement policy in areas where federal, state, and local authority
most overlap.”).
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concerns regarding discrimination and noted that federal prosecutions
avoided local and far more diverse juries.305
Project Exile received so much positive attention as a local experiment
that it soon provided a template for a national program. In the early 2000s,
DOJ launched Project Safe Neighborhoods (“PSN”), building on those
earlier efforts.306 PSN became “the federal government’s most formal and
extensive expansion into local law enforcement.”307 President George W.
Bush announced the expansion as based on a need for a “focused national
strategy” to curtail violent crime.308 Then-Attorney General John Ashcroft
explained the program as “disarmingly simple: federal, state and local law
enforcement officers and prosecutors working together to investigate, arrest
and prosecute criminals with guns to get the maximum penalties available
under state or federal law.”309 The PSN program “resulted from public
discourse of the ‘gun problem’ amid a tough-on-crime political backdrop.”310
Bonita Gardner observes that the federal government “committed more
than $900 million for [PSN] over the first three years,” the result of which
was that “federal gun prosecutions nationwide increased by seventy-three
percent” from 2000-2005.311 Once again, concerns arose and were litigated
regarding the manner in which largely Black neighborhoods were selected as

305 See United States v. Jones, 36 F. Supp. 2d 304, 311-12 (E.D. Va. 1999) (“[I]f, as proponents
of Project Exile maintain, there are disparities in the effectiveness of federal and state prosecutions,
then those disparities only increase the potential for discriminatory diversions for federal
prosecution absent some form of review.”).
306 See, e.g., Edmund F. McGarrell, Nicholas Corsaro, Natalie Kroovand Hipple & Timothy
S. Bynum, Project Safe Neighborhoods and Violent Crime Trends in US Cities: Assessing Violent Crime
Impact, 26 J. QUANT. CRIMINOLOGY 165, 168 (2010) (“After some degree of problem analysis, all
[precursors to PSN] moved from responding to crime generally to having a very specific and
proactive focus on gun crime.”).
307 Patton, supra note 158, at 1449.
308 William Partlett, Criminal Law and Cooperative Federalism, 56 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1663, 1676 (2019).
309 John Ashcroft, Att’y Gen., Prepared Remarks at Project Safe Neighborhoods National
Conference (Jan. 30, 2003).
310 Andrew V. Papachristos, Tracey L. Meares & Jeffrey Fagan, Attention Felons: Evaluating
Project Safe Neighborhoods in Chicago, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 223, 225 (2007).
311 Bonita R. Gardner, Separate and Unequal: Federal Tough-on-Guns Program Targets Minority
Communities for Selective Enforcement, 12 MICH. J. RACE & L. 305, 311 (2007); see also, Comment,
Victoria L. Killion, No Points for the Assist? A Closer Look at the Role of Special Assistant United States
Attorneys in the Cooperative Model of Federal Prosecutions, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 789, 797 (2009) (“In 2005,
the Department of Justice . . . reported a seventy-three percent increase in the number of firearms
cases filed nationwide in federal courts in the five years since the federal government had launched
the program.”). The funding has now topped $1 billion. See Ben Grunwald & Andrew V.
Papachristos, Project Safe Neighborhoods in Chicago: Looking Back a Decade Later, 107 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 131, 132 (2017) (“Since 2001, Congress has allocated over a billion dollars to the U.S.
Attorney’s Office to oversee PSN programs in the 94 federal districts.”).
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sites for these prosecution efforts.312 Research on the effectiveness of the
programs has been decidedly mixed.313 Nevertheless, such programs have
continued to expand. In 2017, then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions stated that
“Project Safe Neighborhoods is . . . the centerpiece of our crime reduction
strategy.”314 President Trump described a commitment to “restore” the project
as “one of the most effective crime prevention strategies in America.”315
And in November 2019, the Trump Administration launched Project
Guardian. As then-Attorney General Barr said when announcing the
program, “Project Guardian is a national initiative to comprehensively attack
gun violence through the aggressive enforcement of existing gun laws.”316
Guardian, he said, “will be in every district. The idea is to use our existing
gun laws to incapacitate the most dangerous and violent offenders.”317
In contrast to PSN and Project Guardian, in which cooperative federalism
has been championed, the cooperative federalism approach to improving
compliance with NICS has been less successful, and the federal government
has not sought to impose penalties for noncompliance.318 Prosecutors play the
role, in individual cases, as the enforcers of gun prosecution priorities.
Financial incentives and penalties, in contrast, provide more indirect (and it
seems less effective) means to carry out federal priorities.

312 See Gardner, supra note 311, at 316-17 (“According to statistics presented in the Eastern
District of Michigan, almost ninety percent of those prosecuted under Project Safe Neighborhoods
are African American.”); see, e.g., United States v. Hubbard, Crim. No. 04-80321, 2006 WL 1374047,
at *1 (E.D. Mich. May 17, 2006) (“Petitioner argues that Project Safe Neighborhoods is targeted at
African-Americans, and therefore that he was subject to racially selective prosecution.”); see also
Shreefter, supra note 2, at 160 (“Federal programs have existed for twenty-six years to ensure the most
aggressive enforcement of gun laws and have been set up to systemically target Black communities.”).
313 See, e.g., Papachristos, Meares & Eagan, supra note 310, at 254 (reporting Chicago’s
implementation of PSN showed promise in reducing the city’s homicide rate); id. at 227-28
(discussing conflicting studies on the effectiveness of Operation Ceasefire and Project Exile);
Grunwald & Papachristos, supra note 310, at 135 (finding minimal long-term effects of PSN Chicago).
314 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Attorney General Sessions Announces Reinvigoration
of Project Safe Neighborhoods and Other Actions to Reduce Rising Tide of Violent Crime (Oct. 5, 2017).
315 President Donald Trump, Remarks at the Safe Neighborhoods National Convention (Dec.
7, 2018) (transcript available via C-SPAN).
316 William Barr, Att’y Gen., Remarks at the Launch of Project Guardian (Nov. 13, 2019).
317 Id.
318 Regarding penalties for non-compliance states, see NICS Improvement Amendments Act
of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-180, § 104, 121 Stat. 2559, 2568-69. More recent legislation, enacted in 2018,
once again aims to remedy non-compliance. However, given poor compliance in the past, “[i]t
remains to be seen, however, how effective the Fix NICS Act will be.” Jaclyn Schildkraut & Collin
M. Carr, Mass Shootings, Legislative Responses, and Public Policy: An Endless Cycle of Inaction, 69 EMORY
L.J. 1043, 1065 (2020); see also O’Donnell, supra note 5, 1425.
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C. Immigration Prosecution and Guns
Federal gun prosecutions play an increasing role in immigration-related
enforcement. Federal arrests of non-U.S. citizens have increased sharply in
contrast to the overall rate of arrests: between 1998 and 2018, arrests of
immigrants increased by 233.5%, while arrests of U.S. citizens increased by
only 10%.319 These arrests also represent a cooperative federalism story: The
bulk of these arrests are initiated only after local and state law enforcement
make arrests and conduct immigration screening.320
Weapons charges represent a substantial portion of these federal
immigration arrests, although to be sure, they still represent a far larger
portion of arrests of citizens than of noncitizens. In 2018, law enforcement
conducted 10,562 arrests for weapons charges, and 10,077 (95.6%) persons
arrested were U.S. citizens.321 This figure represents 14.3% of total arrests of
U.S. citizens.322 Meanwhile, 468 (4.4%) were of noncitizens, and these arrests
represented only 0.4% of arrests of noncitizens.323 Prosecution rates, on the
other hand, tended to be higher: in 2018, 4% of suspects prosecuted on
weapons charges in U.S. District Court were noncitizens.324 ICE also reports
non-criminal administrative arrests. In 2019, there were 10,278 total weapons
offenses for such administrative arrests.325 There were 3,281 total criminal
charges and 6,997 criminal convictions.326
In a related cooperative federalism point, civil immigration enforcement
has made greater use of state, not federal, gun offenses. ICE also highlights
its work: “[F]irearms, ammunition, and explosives smuggling investigations
have resulted in unprecedented bi-lateral interdictions, investigations and
information-sharing activities that identify, disrupt, and dismantle
transnational criminal networks operating within the United States, Mexico,
Canada, Central America, the Caribbean, and around the World.”327 In 2015,
319 MARK MOTIVANS, IMMIGRATION, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., CITIZENSHIP, AND THE
FEDERAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, 1998-2018 7 tbl. 4 (2019).
320 See Eisha Jain, The Interior Structure of Immigration Enforcement, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 1463,
1477 (2019) (“Since 2013 . . . every custodial criminal arrest . . . has triggered immigration
screening.”); Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion That Matters: Federal Immigration Enforcement, State
and Local Arrests, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1819, 1858 (2011) (“[B]ecause the
federal government has exercised minimal post-arrest discretion, the key decisionmaking moment
has been the initial identification of a potentially removable noncitizen by some form of arrest.”).
321 MOTIVANS, supra note 319, at 10.
322 Id.
323 Id.
324 Id. at 18.
325 2019 U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’ FISCAL YEAR
2019 ENF’ & REMOVAL OPERATIONS REP. 14.
326 Id.
327 U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, FIREARMS, AMMUNITION, AND EXPLOSIVES
SMUGGLING INVESTIGATIONS (2018).
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ICE implemented a Priority Enforcement Policy in order to focus on
particular categories of undocumented immigrants.328 Firearms possession
was contained in the Priority 2 category, which included misdemeanants and
new immigration violators.329 In 2015, 14,869 out of 139,368 convicted
criminal removals, or 11%, fell into priority 2.330 In 2016, 31,936 out of 238,466
civil priority removals, or 13.3%, fell into Priority 2.331 Thus, many of these
civil removals include state, not federal, firearms offenses.
What both Project Safe Neighborhoods and ICE’s Priority Enforcement
Policy have in common is that local and state cases are shifted over to federal
authorities, who take custody of an individual and impose civil immigration and
sometimes additional criminal consequences based on gun-involved conduct.
III. TOWARDS A UNIFIED VIEW OF FEDERAL GUN CRIMES
In Part I, we described the evolution of three families of federal crimes:
early gun statutes, possession-focused statutes, and modern regulatory
statutes that aim higher upstream by trying to deter unlawful transfers. In
Part II, we turned to how these statutes have been enforced. In this Part, we
turn to implications for this entire body of law, which has not been treated as
unified and has evolved piecemeal, often based on distinct policy interests.
We (1) identify patterns and observations from descriptions and data in the
previous Parts, (2) lay out pathologies with the current federal criminal legal
approach to firearms, and (3) chart the path forward to a more just,
reasonable, and coherent approach to federal regulation of guns.
A. The Patterns
We find three themes in the trajectory of the laws traced in Parts I and II:
the legislative compromise on severe punishment; the dichotomizing treatment
that aims to secure guns for the “good guys” and keep them from the “bad
guys”; and the limited judicial check on federal prosecution of gun crimes.

328 2015 U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T ICE ENF’T & REMOVAL OPERATIONS REP. FISCAL
YEAR 2015 1.
329 Id. at 18. For these purposes, a “significant misdemeanor” is “an offense of domestic
violence; 1 sexual abuse or exploitation; burglary; unlawful possession or use of a firearm; drug
distribution or trafficking; or driving under the influence; or if not an offense listed above, one for
which the individual was sentenced to time in custody of 90 days or more (the sentence must involve
time to be served in custody, and does not include a suspended sentence) . . . .” Id.
330 Id. at 3.
331 2016 U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T ICE ENF’T & REMOVAL OPERATIONS REP. 3 (2016).
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1. The Severity Compromise
Gun laws operate uniquely in the space of social regulatory policy.332 First
and foremost, the core federal gun crimes often serve as sentencing enhancers
for a range of other federal offenses: as the Department of Justice puts it
simply, “Federal firearms laws provide severe penalties for firearms use by the
violent offender or drug trafficker.”333 The § 924(c) sentencing provisions
require lengthy five-, seven-, ten-, or even thirty-year mandatory minimum
sentences for possessing, brandishing, or discharging a gun in the course of a
drug trafficking crime or a crime of violence, with twenty-five year mandatory
sentences for each subsequent conviction.334 Further, these sentences cannot
be concurrent with any other felony or state sentence.335 Similarly, the related
Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), contained in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e),
requires a fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence.336
Over time, Congress has extended the length of these mandatory
minimum sentences, transforming a single sentence of § 924(c) into a
detailed sentencing code, which in turn has engendered a detailed case law.337
As the Department of Justice summarizes: “Firearms violations should be
aggressively used in prosecuting violent crime. They are generally simple and
quick to prove. The mandatory and enhanced punishments for many firearms
violations can be used as leverage to gain plea bargaining and cooperation
from offenders.”338 And, as Benjamin Levin observes, “gun possession statutes
bear the heavy mark of the sharply retributive turn that U.S. criminal justice
policy took over the latter portion of the twentieth century.”339 Firearms
possession offenses constituted the second most common type of non-violent
life without parole sentences at the federal level from 1999 to 2011.340
The U.S. Sentencing Commission, in a 2018 report on mandatory
minimums in firearm offenses, found “[f]irearms offenses accounted for 16.8
percent of offenses carrying a mandatory minimum penalty in fiscal year
332 See SPITZER, supra note 39, at ch.1 (explaining how gun regulations are best described as
part of social regulatory policy).
333 U.S. D EP ’ T OF J UST ., C RIMINAL R ESOURCE M ANUAL 112 (2020),
https://www.justice.gov/archives/jm/criminal-resource-manual-112-firearms-charges
[https://perma.cc/E5GE-9432].
334 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)-(C).
335 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii).
336 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).
337 See supra Part I.
338 U.S. Dep’t of Just., supra note 333.
339 Levin, supra note 35, at 2214-15.
340 See ACLU, A LIVING DEATH: LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR NONVIOLENT OFFENSES 24
(2013), https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/111813-lwop-complete-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/F5E7-V9M6]
(documenting that of federal inmates admitted for nonviolent offenses between 1999 and 2011, 19.9% were
incarcerated for nonviolent firearms offenses).

686

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 170: 637

2016—the second largest category following drug offenses—increasing from
14.4 percent in fiscal year 2010.”341 The Commission also reported stark racial
disparities in those convicted of federal firearms offenses, where over half of
those convicted under § 924(c) were Black and almost 30 percent Latinx.342
Those disparities, however, may arise not from sentencing, but from the
targeting of federal firearms prosecutions through programs such as those
described in Part II.
As a matter of politics, these enhancements are fairly uncontroversial.343
“Mandatory sentencing or sentence-enhancement for crimes committed with
a gun are politically popular because they offer an apparent means of
controlling gun violence without apparent cost to law-abiding gun owners.”344
They are often the one measure both pro- and anti-gun regulation advocates
can agree on, leading to a “crucial point of consensus” on guns: “Both sides
of the gun control debate have occasionally compromised, and these
compromises have generally yielded criminal statutes designed to impose
harsh punishments on unlawful gun owners.”345 Or, as Jonathan Simon puts
it: “both sides of the gun debate share a remarkably similar perception that
lethal violence poses a significant and ongoing threat to their personal
security, and their ability to protect their homes and families.”346
This emphasis on severity in the statute has sometimes resulted from
congressional response to narrowing constructions by the Supreme Court,
but just as often due to the Court’s own interpretations. As we have
discussed, § 924(c) has undergone several revisions, often in response to
Supreme Court rulings that Congress thought had construed it too
narrowly.347 In Simpson v. United States, the Court held that a defendant could
341 U.S. S ENT ’ G C OMM ’ N , M ANDATORY M INIMUM P ENALTIES FOR F IREARMS
O FFENSES IN THE F EDERAL C RIMINAL J USTICE S YSTEM
16
(2018),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/researchpublications/2018/20180315_Firearms-Mand-Min.pdf [https://perma.cc/G9BH-P8KV].
342 Id. at 6.
343 See Milton Heumann, Colin Loftin & David McDowall, Federal Firearms Policy and
Mandatory Sentencing, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1051, 1051 (1982) (noting that policy
“requiring a mandatory sentence for the use of a firearm in the commission of a federal felony . . . is
widely supported by the public and the police . . .”).
344 Colin Loftin, Milton Heumann & David McDowall, Mandatory Sentencing and Firearms
Violence: Evaluating an Alternative to Gun Control, 17 L. & SOC’Y REV. 287, 312 (1983).
345 Levin, supra note 35, at 2192. Elizabeth Hinton makes a similar point about early efforts to
restrict firearm use and ownership. See ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO
THE WAR ON CRIME: THE MAKING OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 265 (2016) (ebook)
(“[President Gerald] Ford’s attack on low-cost firearms did, however, receive an outpouring of
support from ardent gun control opponents such as Republican National Committee chairman Bob
Dole and Senate Republican leader Hugh Scott, even if the measure seemed to contradict the
Republican Party’s strong commitment to the second amendment.”).
346 Jonathan Simon, Guns, Crime, and Governance, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 133, 134 (2002).
347 See supra Part I.B.1.
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not be sentenced for both the § 924(c) offense and an underlying crime that
already provided enhanced penalties for using a weapon.348 Two years later
in Busic v. United States, it explained that Simpson did not give the
Government the authority to choose whichever of the two offenses generated
a greater sentence.349 Instead, “prosecution and enhanced sentencing under
§ 924(c) is simply not permissible where the predicate felony statute contains
its own enhancement provision.”350 Congress was not that harsh, thought the
Court. “[B]y rejecting double enhancement,” the Court said, its decision in
Simpson had “expose[d] the stark and unidimensional quality of any calculus
which attempts to construe the statute on the basis of an assumption that in
enacting § 924(c) Congress’ sole objective was to increase the penalties for
firearm use to the maximum extent possible.”351 Congress clarified its
unidimensional intent when it amended the provision in 1984.352 As the Court
later said, “Congress thus repudiated the result” from Simpson and Busic.353
Similarly, in its 1995 ruling in Bailey v. United States, the Court interpreted
“use” as active employment of the firearm and more than “mere possession.”354
Congress’s “Bailey fix” amended § 924(c) again to clarify that mere possession
in furtherance of a crime is, in fact, grounds for enhancement.355
But with these few exceptions, many of the Court’s decisions under
§ 924(c) rejected interpretations of the statute that might have narrowed its
reach.356 In 1993, in Deal v. United States, for example, the Court read the
statute broadly, ruling that additional penalties for a “second or subsequent
conviction” could result from a second 924(c) conviction in the same
proceeding as the first.357 That same year, it concluded that “use” of a gun in
a crime included trading the gun for drugs.358 In Muscarello v. United States,

348 See Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 16 (1978) (holding defendant could not be
sentenced under both § 924(c) and another statute arising from the same bank robbery because the
other statute already provided for more severe penalties when a firearm was involved in the offense).
349 See Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398, 399-400 (1979) (“We hold that the sentence
received by such a defendant may be enhanced only under the enhancement provision in the statute
defining the felony he committed and that § 924(c) does not apply in such a case.”).
350 Id. at 404.
351 Id. at 409.
352 See United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 10 (1997) (describing Congress’s amendment to
§ 924(c), “thus repudiate[ing] the result [the Court] reached in Busic”).
353 Id.
354 Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 143 (1995) (holding the word “use” in § 924(c) “must
connote more than mere possession of a firearm by a person who commits a drug offense.”).
355 Abbott v. United States, 562 U.S. 8, 16-17 (2010).
356 Id. at 13 (rejecting a technical reading that would have restricted the scope of the statute).
357 Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 135 (1993).
358 Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 236-37 (1993).
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the Court held a person “carries” a gun during a crime even when the gun is
locked in the trunk or glove compartment of a traveling vehicle.359
Writing in the early 1980s, as harsh mandatory sentences began to sweep
across the country and eventually through Congress, some researchers
initially described these laws as “something like a criminological wonder
drug—a plan to reduce violent crime at minimal cost with no serious side
effects.”360 Black community leaders initially supported many of the laws that
prescribed harsh sentences for unlawful gun use because they wanted to show
that Black victims of gun violence mattered.361 As James Forman thoroughly
documents, law enforcement had for so long neglected the crime in Black
communities and shrugged off the deaths of Black citizens that the response
of those living in these communities was to call for greater enforcement and
tougher punishment.362 Many joined in the increasingly common calls that
were then epitomizing the American criminal justice system: “When you
want to stop people from doing something, take away discretion and impose
more prison time.”363
There is, then, a dual pressure in gun laws toward increasingly punitive
treatment. Proponents of “gun control” want legislation to control firearms
based on the harm they can cause. Opponents of gun control want to make
sure that law-abiding citizens are not inconvenienced in their sporting,
hunting, and defense uses. As sociologist Jennifer Carlson writes, “[t]his is
the often-overlooked common ground of the gun control and gun rights
lobbies in the late twentieth century: both endorsed policies that harshly
sanctioned the kinds of gun criminals associated with urban street crime.”364
We see this play out in the types of gun crimes that gain the attention of
federal prosecutors and the public.
2. The Enforcement Emphasis
The severity framework reveals a related fact about the federal criminal
framework: the entire structure revolves around aiming to secure, protect,
and defend the rights of law-abiding citizens to keep and bear guns while
visiting extreme punishment on the bad apples. We recognize both the
devastating harm guns can do and the impulse to use all the levers to punish
criminal misuse. We also recognize the impulse to protect some beneficial use
359 Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 126-27 (1998).
360 Heumann, Loftin & McDowall, supra note 343, at 1052. Researchers came to disavow this view. Id.
361 JAMES FORMAN, JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK
AMERICA 60-63 (2017).
362 See id. at 56 (describing police indifference to Black crime deaths).
363 Id. at 61.
364 JENNIFER CARLSON, POLICING THE SECOND AMENDMENT: GUNS, LAW

ENFORCEMENT, AND THE POLITICS OF RACE 56 (2020).
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of guns. As Forman notes, “a gun may be the only dangerous item that can
plausibly be viewed as a solution to the very danger it poses.”365
Those competing impulses have resulted in an approach to drafting,
enforcing, and applying the federal gun laws that focuses on possession
offenses. Instead of prioritizing holding manufacturers, distributors, and
dealers to account, federal prosecutors focus on bringing charges against
street-level offenders, often in conjunction with prosecuting other statutes.366
Instead of licensing or registration systems to vet gun users and track the flow
of guns, Congress passes laws stacking mandatory minimums for use or
possession of a gun in a crime.367 Indeed, this disjunction was intentional. As
William Vizzard chronicles:
For most of the Reagan and Bush administrations, the opponents of [firearm]
controls dominated the agenda. ATF shifted its attention away from
commerce in firearms and concentrated almost exclusively on armed felons
and drug traffickers. With this change, ATF’s resources began to increase
markedly as it became an integral part of the administration’s war on drugs.
Within the agency, the message was clear: avoid all contact with any activity
perceived as gun control.368

As a result, gun crime policy at the federal level is largely reactive and not
proactive,369 focusing on severely punishing those who have already broken
the law (regardless of whether the present firearms-related activity is
deserving of severe punishment). It seizes on the outgroups that are often
unpopular with legislators and the voters they represent.370 As Benjamin
Levin points out, “the NRA and other opponents of gun control regulation
have frequently made an exception for criminal statutes. These statutes reflect
a popular motto of the NRA—‘guns don’t kill people; people kill people.’”371
FORMAN, supra note 361, at 64.
Gardner, supra note 311, at 312 (observing that prosecutors focus almost exclusively on
922(g) and 924(c) while “[t]he other twenty major federal gun crimes—including gun trafficking,
corrupt gun dealers, stolen guns, selling to minors, obliterating serial numbers, and lying on the
background check form—are almost never prosecuted.”).
367 See Abbott v. United States, 562 U.S. 8, 17 (2010) (discussing several steps Congress took
to increase the severity of § 924(c) offenses).
368 Vizzard, Impact, supra note 36, at 343 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 345 (“ATF has characterized
itself as a law enforcement agency using the gun laws to impact crime and not as a gun control agency.”).
369 The laws may still be prevention oriented, at least in theory, based on a belief these groups will
misuse firearms. See Shreefter, supra note 92, at 154 (“Based on the assumptions underlying the ‘felon in
possession’ statute, it is clear that this statute criminalizes a possibility of harm rather than actual harm.”).
370 See Douglas N. Husak, Guns and Drugs: Case Studies on the Principled Limits of the Criminal
Sanction, 23 L. & PHIL. 437, 479 (2004) (“Felons, drug users or illegal aliens who are punished for
unlawful gun possession are unlikely to attract much sympathy from a public that tends to believe
that our state treats criminals too leniently.”).
371 Levin, supra note 35, at 2222.
365
366
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3. The Limited Judicial Check
Federal gun crimes have been frequently litigated, and these cases have
affected the interpretation of the statutes. But if there is one key lesson from
what we have described, it is that the body of case law that has developed has
left the core power of these statutes and of prosecutors largely intact. As one
example, consider § 924(c), providing enhanced punishment for certain uses
or possession of firearms in the commission of a felony. The Congressional
Research Service has noted that this provision has withstood constitutional
challenges based on the Second Amendment’s right to bear arms; the Eighth
Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishments prohibition; the Sixth
Amendment’s right to a jury trial; the Fifth Amendment’s double jeopardy
and due process prescriptions; and the Constitution’s structural limitations
on the preservation of the separation of powers and on Congress’s authority
under the Commerce Clause.372
Nor has the Second Amendment posed much, if any barrier, to the other
federal criminal statutes. Separating a firearm rights-bearer from a firearm
lawbreaker can be a fine line that often depends on unobservable factors like
criminal or mental health history or present intent.373 Those lines have been
largely defined by the criminal statutes described. They have not (to date)
been reconsidered by the U.S. Supreme Court, which in District of Columbia
v. Heller struck down a Washington D.C. handgun ban, but highlighted that
it did not call into question “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of
firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of
firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws
imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.”374
Lower courts have largely agreed that §§ 922, 924(c), and ACCA are not
affected by Heller.375
Similarly, the federalism restrictions that accompany a government of
limited power have not posed much of a barrier. Gun crimes have been the
372 CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41412, FEDERAL MANDATORY MINIMUM
SENTENCING: THE 18 U.S.C. 924(C) TACK-ON IN CASES INVOLVING DRUGS OR VIOLENCE
(2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41412.pdf [https://perma.cc/VR77-HASD].
373 Husak, supra note 372, at 454 (“The same characteristics that make a gun useful for criminal
purposes are those that make it useful for legitimate purposes as well—most notably, for selfprotection. Whatever may be the case with illicit drugs, it is impossible to identify a kind of gun
that is widely used unlawfully but lacks a legitimate purpose.”).
374 554 U.S. 570, 626-27 (2008).
375 United States v. Napolitan, 762 F.3d 297, 311 (3d Cir. 2014); United States v. Bryant, 711
F.3d 364, 368-70 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam); United States v. Potter, 630 F.3d 1260, 1261 (9th Cir.
2011) (per curiam); United States v. Jackson, 555 F.3d 635, 636 (7th Cir. 2009). But see, e.g., Binderup
v. Att’y Gen., 836 F.3d 336, 357 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc) (upholding Second Amendment challenge
to § 922(g)(1) for two individuals as the government failed to present enough evidence to bar two
individuals from possessing firearms in their homes).
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subject of several U.S. Supreme Court rulings regarding the reach of
enumerated federal power and federalism.376 In this Article, we have not
focused on the jurisdictional questions that firearms raise when federal
prosecutions are brought largely because the Supreme Court has made clear
that federal prosecutors have broad-reaching authority to apply federal
firearms statutes to local offenders.377
The Court first ruled on the 1968 felon-in-possession statute in United
States v. Bass, rejecting the Department of Justice’s position that the criminal
statute created jurisdiction over any felon possessing a firearm, and
interpreting the statute to require a connection with interstate commerce.378
However, the Bass Court explained that a firearm itself that “previously
travelled in interstate commerce” might satisfy the Commerce Clause,379 as
applied to a particular federal possession prosecution. The Court then
adopted that approach in its 1977 ruling in Scarborough v. United States, stating
that the government need only show that the firearm had at some time
previously travelled in interstate commerce.380 In its important federalism
ruling in United States v. Lopez, the Court nevertheless indicated that any
Commerce Clause concern can be satisfied through the use of a jurisdictional
element connected to a firearm, an item that itself travels in interstate commerce.381
The ubiquity of firearms, almost all of which have previously travelled across
state lines simply by virtue of their manufacture and distribution, makes the
reach of federal firearms statutes extremely broad and readily satisfies the
jurisdictional requirements as defined by the U.S. Supreme Court.382
The overlapping provisions in the statute, however, mean that judicial
review plays only a haphazard role in restraining prosecution efforts; thus
while the Court in United States v. Watson stated that acquiring a gun during
a drug transaction did not amount to “use,”383 lower courts have held that
Beale, supra note 35, at 1643.
Patton, supra note 293, at 1011 (noting how in the 1990s prosecutors “shifted their focus away
from crimes with obvious interstate connections to crimes that were once thought of as purely local”
when they started pursuing gun crimes with increased fervor).
378 404 U.S. 336, 340 (1971).
379 Id. at 350 (finding prosecutors must allege and prove a connection to interstate commerce
in a federal firearms prosecution but noting how readily that standard can be satisfied).
380 431 U.S. 563, 566-67, 577 (1977) (“[T]here is no question that Congress intended no more
than a minimal nexus requirement.”).
381 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (“[The statute] contains no jurisdictional element which would ensure,
through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question affects interstate commerce.”).
382 See David B. Kopel, Pretend “Gun-Free” School Zones: A Deadly Legal Fiction, 42 CONN. L. REV. 515,
519 (2009) (describing Congress’s post-Lopez addition of a requirement that a gun move in interstate
commerce and noting that it covers “virtually all guns”); Jeff Asher & Mai Nguyen, Gun Laws Stop at State
Lines, But Guns Don’t, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Oct. 26, 2017), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/gun-lawsstop-at-state-lines-but-guns-dont [https://perma.cc/4ZYY-GCVP].
383 552 U.S. 74, 76 (2007).
376
377
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doing so may be “in furtherance” of the predicate drug crimes under
§ 924(c).384 The aiding and abetting offense, even as interpreted in a modestly
more narrow fashion by the Court, remains quite broad.385
Similarly, in its Sixth Amendment rulings, such as Alleyne v. United States,
the Court has held that elements, such as the brandishing element, are
sentence enhancers that must be presented to the jury.386 The severity of the
sentencing enhancements plays a role in the Court’s reasoning; as it put it in
United States v. O’Brien, “[t]he immense danger posed by machineguns, the
moral depravity in choosing the weapon, and the substantial increase in the
minimum sentence provided by the statute support the conclusion that this
prohibition is an element of the crime, not a sentencing factor.”387 Yet, where
the vast majority of federal prosecutions settle in plea bargaining,388 such
rulings do not significantly impact prosecution efforts.389 Further, where
Congress has perceived a problem in how courts have interpreted federal gun
crimes, it has reacted swiftly, such as in its § 924(c) post-Bailey fix.390
That said, things might be changing. The Supreme Court has recently, in
the past half-decade, struck down or severely restricted the scope of several
major federal gun crimes. The Supreme Court’s 2015 ruling in Johnson v.
United States struck down as unconstitutionally vague the residual clause in
ACCA that included as a predicate offense a nonenumerated felony that
“otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical
injury to another.”391 Just a few years later, the Court in United States v. Davis
said part of § 924(c) was infected with the same vagueness problems.392
384 United States v. Gurka, 605 F.3d 40, 44 (1st Cir. 2010) (“We join the three circuits holding
Watson does not affect the prong of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) concerned with ‘possession in furtherance.’”).
385 See, e.g., Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65, 74 (2014) (“Rosemond therefore could assist
in §924(c)’s violation by facilitating either the drug transaction or the firearms use (or of course both).”).
386 570 U.S. 99, 117 (2013) (“Because the finding of brandishing increased the penalty to which the
defendant was subjected, it was an element, which had to be found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
387 560 U.S. 218, 230 (2010).
388 CARISSA BYRNE HESSICK, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT TRIAL: WHY PLEA BARGAINING IS
A BAD DEAL 22 (2021) (“[S]ince 1995 the guilty plea rate has remained above 90 percent [of
adjudicated cases]”).
389 Stephen Schulhofer and Ilene Nagel documented in the late 1980s the degree to which
federal prosecutors use § 924(c) for charge bargaining, following the enactment of the Sentencing
Guidelines. See Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Negotiated Pleas Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: The First Fifteen Months, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 231, 281 (1989) (describing how federal
prosecutors can induce a plea from a defendant by offering to drop corresponding weapon counts
under § 924(c)).
390 See Abbott v. United States, 562 U.S. 8, 16-17 (2010) (describing Congressional legislation
to bring possession of a firearm within the scope of § 924(c) in reaction to the holding in Bailey
three years earlier).
391 See 576 U.S. 591, 594 602 (2015) (“Invoking so shapeless a provision to condemn someone
to prison for 15 years to life does not comport with the Constitution’s guarantee of due process.”);
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).
392 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2336 (2019).
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Similarly, the 2019 ruling in Rehaif v. United States found a problem
affecting all firearm possession crimes.393 There, the petitioner, a noncitizen,
had been expelled from a university in Florida, ending his lawful status on a
student visa.394 He was arrested after using firearms at a shooting range under
§ 922(g), which prohibits certain persons, including those without lawful
immigration status, to possess a firearm in or affecting interstate commerce;
the penalty provision in § 924(a)(2) imposes punishment on one who
“knowingly violates” § 922.395 The Court concluded that this mens rea term
from § 924 applies to all § 922(g) offenses (relying on the Model Penal Code,
no less).396 Further, the Court discussed legislative history, finding that it was
inconclusive on the question of mens rea.397
Justice Breyer, writing for the majority, in holding the statutes required
knowledge of status as well as conduct, noted that the revised legislation
included statements by drafters that “the absence of a scienter requirement
in the prior statutes had resulted in ‘severe penalties for unintentional
missteps.’”398 “The firearms provisions before us,” he explained, “are not part
of a regulatory or public welfare program, and they carry a potential penalty
of 10 years in prison that we have previously described as ‘harsh.’”399
The opinion might have broader implications for the Court’s
interpretation of statutory mens rea or, as Jessica Roth notes, “it could all just
be about the guns.”400 What the opinion represents, though, is the Court
interpreting across firearms provisions—from the sentencing provisions in
§ 924, to the elements set out in § 922—considering both the legislative
history and the harshness of the resulting penalties. Such reasoning, with
echoes of the Court’s reasoning in Bass and other prior rulings, does represent
increasing judicial engagement. In the past, such rulings, as noted, have not
strongly affected core enforcement. In many cases, showing knowledge will
not be challenging for prosecutors. The Court, given Congress’ response to
past rulings, might be unlikely to go farther than a holistic interpretation of
text across provisions in the statute. If so, then any more lasting change would
need to be legislative.

139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019).
Id. at 2194, 2201.
Id. at 2194.
Id. at 2195 (quoting ALI, Model Penal Code § 2.02(4), p. 22 (1985)).
Id. at 2197-99.
Id. at 2199 (citing 132 Cong. Rec. 9590 (1986) (statement of Sen. Hatch)).
Id. at 2197.
Jessica A. Roth, Rehaif v. United States: Once Again, a Gun Case Makes Surprising Law, 32
FED. SENT’G REP. 23, 26 (2019).
393
394
395
396
397
398
399
400
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B. The Pathologies
Although many of the pathologies of the federal gun crime regime stand
out just from the description of the patterns in the prior Section, we highlight
here two deeper ones: the irrationality of the severe sentencing approach and
the race and class inequities in the system.
1. A Broken Proportionality
Even as sentencing enhancements form a core bedrock of federal gun
crime policy, they are imposed sporadically and haphazardly. Prosecutors have
nearly unlimited discretion to choose which gun cases to take federal,
resulting in a system of wide disparity. As a result,
[O]ffenders are subject to a kind of cruel lottery, in which a small minority
of the persons who commit a particular offense is selected for federal
prosecution and subjected to much harsher sentences—and often to
significantly less favorable procedural or substantive standards—than persons
prosecuted for parallel state offenses.401

This leads to outcomes at odds with sound penal theory and with the
stated goals of the Sentencing Guidelines themselves: to reduce unwarranted
sentencing disparities for similar conduct.402
The lack of relationship between culpability and punishment—that the
same gun crime can be punished much more severely if it happens to occur
on “federal day”—is one sign of a severely broken system.403 But even if the
punishment were imposed consistently, that would not be much better. The
research is clear that imposing increasingly harsh sentences is not an effective
way to reduce gun crime.404 Consider United States v. Rivera-Ruperto.405 The
defendant served as an armed guard during what were, unknown to him, sham
Beale, supra note 269, at 997.
Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon Which They
Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 32 (1988) (describing the intended effect of the Guidelines as
rationalization and lessening of observed disparities among criminal sentences).
403 Patton, supra note 293, at 1030 (“[F]ederal gun possession prosecutions are particularly
vulnerable to deterrence critiques because they do nothing to increase the perceived odds of
detection (which remains almost entirely dependent on local police activity).”).
404 See, e.g., Michael Tonry, Learning from the Limitations of Deterrence Research, 37 CRIME AND
JUST. 279, 284-85 (2008) (describing evidence that a mandatory minimum sentence for use of a gun
in a robbery did not make offenders less likely to carry a gun); Thomas B. Marvell & Carlisle E.
Moody, The Impact of Enhanced Prison Terms for Felonies Committed with Guns, 33 CRIMINOLOGY 247,
269 (1995) (“We found little evidence to support the intended purposes of firearm sentencing
enhancements, reducing crime rates and gun use.”). But see David A. Abrams, Estimating the Deterrent
Effect of Incarceration Using Sentencing Enhancements, 4 AM. ECON. J. 32, 53 (2012) (finding small
deterrent effects of state “add-on” gun laws).
405 852 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2017).
401
402
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drug deals orchestrated by the FBI to catch police corruption in Puerto
Rico.406 In addition to the underlying drug charges, the government charged
the defendant with violating § 924(c) for possessing the gun in furtherance
of the drug trafficking crimes.407 The gun crimes created an enormous
sentence, even though the defendant had no prior criminal record. “[O]f the
combined 161 years and 10 months to which Rivera-Ruperto was sentenced,
the lion’s share of the sentence—130 years to be exact—was the result of
minimum sentences required by statute for Rivera-Ruperto’s six firearms
convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C).”408 The court rejected an Eighth
Amendment challenge to the sentence.409 In an opinion concurring in the
denial of rehearing en banc in the case, Judge Barron concluded:
Rivera faces the longest and most unforgiving possible prison sentence . . . .
only because Congress has been deemed to have made a blanket judgment
that even an offender like Rivera—who has no prior criminal record and
whose series of related crimes resulted in no harm to an identifiable victim—
should have no hope of ever living free. And he does so even though virtually
every comparable jurisdiction punishes comparable criminal conduct less
harshly, and even though the federal government itself punishes nearly the
same or seemingly worse conduct more leniently.410

Although Congress has prospectively fixed the type of sentencing
calculation that led to Rivera’s lengthy sentence with the First Step Act, it left
in place all of the mandatory minimum penalties for gun crimes and refused to
cede discretion to judges to consider offender and offense circumstances.411
2. Race- and Class-Based Inequities
Gun violence itself is a symptom of and driver of inequality. Black
Americans are disproportionately victims of gun homicides; Black men
constitute over half of victims, while only 6% of the population.412 The social
Id. at 4-5.
Id. at 5, 13.
Id. at 16-17.
See Id. at 18 (“The crime of possessing a firearm in furtherance of such a drug trafficking
offense is a grave one, and Congress has made a legislative determination that it requires harsh
punishment. Given the weight of the case law, we see no Eighth Amendment route for secondguessing that legislative judgment.”).
410 United States v. Rivera-Ruperto, 884 F.3d 25, 48 (1st Cir. 2018) (Barron, J., concurring in
the denial of rehearing en banc).
411 First Step Act of 2018, supra note 128.
412 See THE EDUC. FUND TO STOP GUN VIOLENCE & THE COAL. TO STOP GUN
VIOLENCE, A PUBLIC HEALTH CRISIS DECADES IN THE MAKING: A REVIEW OF 2019 CDC GUN
M ORTALITY D ATA 14 (2021), https://efsgv.org/wp-content/uploads/2019CDCdata.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A63Y-QBFS] (“Fifty-three [percent] of all firearm homicide victims (63% of male
406
407
408
409
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and economic costs of gun violence are also visited disproportionately on poor
and minority communities.413 Unfortunately, federal enforcement has not
addressed inequality but instead exacerbates it.414
This enforcement works to reinforce race and class-based hierarchies by
using the blunt instrument of incarceration to counteract what are often other
and deeper-rooted problems. As Benjamin Levin writes, the federal “criminal
gun possession statutes exacerbate the pathologies identified in the context
of the War on Drugs.”415 Thus, the federal felon-in-possession statute works
by penalizing gun possession by persons already-convicted of drug, violent
felony, and other offenses. We know that those inputs—who gets convicted
and for what—are already the result of systematic practices that work against
Black Americans. And if Black Americans are more likely to be charged with
a crime than White Americans, then they are that much more likely both to
get a gun-disqualifying conviction and to be the one with a gun-disqualifying
conviction who gets caught unlawfully possessing a firearm.416 Further, as we
have described, enforcement priorities can further exacerbate inequality by
tending to remove local cases to federal courts where there are less diverse juries,
harsher sentencing options, and less overall local political accountability.417
As criticism has resulted in some efforts to address drug sentencing
disparities and mandatory minimums, a similar movement has not occurred
with the same urgency in regard to federal gun offenses. If anything, the trend
toward increasing the number and severity of federal gun prosecutions has
deepened over the past few years. In 2011, the U.S. Sentencing Commission
made detailed recommendations to change the severity and mandatory nature
of § 924(c) in several respects, but those proposals have not been followed to
date except for the minor revisions we noted in the First Step Act.418 And
victims) in 2019 were Black males.”); JESSE D. MCKINNON & CLAUDETTE E. BENNETT, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, WE THE PEOPLE: BLACKS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 tbl. 1 (2005).
413 See PHILIP J. COOK & JENS LUDWIG, GUN VIOLENCE: THE REAL COSTS 21 (2000)
(describing an overrepresentation of young minority males and people of low socioeconomic status
in victims of gun violence).
414 Patton, supra note 293, at 1038 (“[Increased enforcement has] led to a dramatic, and largely
unquestioned, increase in prison sentences for poor people of color.”).
415 Levin, supra note 35, at 2179.
416 See Shreefter, supra note 92, at 157, 159-60 (noting that felon-in-possession statutes both
disproportionately affect Black populations and are aggressively enforced in Black communities).
417 See Richman, supra note 273, at 397-98 (considering “over-federalization” objections to
Project Exile); Levin, supra note 35, at 2212 (discussing use of federal gun charges to secure a federal
forum to avoid a more racially diverse local jury pool). For many of these reasons, Christopher Lewis
argues that, instead of sentencing enhancements for repeat offenders, there should be a sentencing
discount. Christopher Lewis, The Paradox of Recidivism, 70 EMORY L.J. 1209 (2021).
418 See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: FEDERAL MANDATORY MINIMUM
PENALTIES 364-65 (2011) (recommending that Congress amend § 924(c) to reduce the length of
mandatory minimum penalties, make increased penalties only applicable to prior convictions, provide
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when prosecutorial leniency options expanded, even the Obama
Administration made sure that guns were treated differently: “gun possession
remained an exclusionary factor for the criteria announced by Attorney
General Holder allowing prosecutors to charge below a mandatory minimum
in certain drug cases.”419
Thus, the problem of inequality in federal enforcement is two-fold: it
visits extremely severe sentences on individuals, often only for tangentially
firearm-related reasons, but it ignores the underlying causes of firearms
violence, which disproportionately burdens underserved and minority
communities. Changes in judicial interpretation of statutes, legislative
efforts, and enforcement have not addressed this disconnect, and instead may
have magnified it.
C. The Path Forward
What would a system look like that did not use guns as a proxy to impose
severe sentences on individuals, often for non-gun-related reasons, but rather
was designed primarily to reduce gun violence? We first look at what answers
might come from within the criminal legal system and then how to expand
outside that system.
1. Reforms Internal to the Criminal-Law Paradigm
While Congress responded to growing concerns regarding racial
disparities in drug sentencing in the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (focusing
on cocaine sentencing and the crack/powder distinction),420 there has been
only minimal effort in the area of firearms prosecution and sentencing. Yet,
as Benjamin Levin has highlighted, “any criminal regulation of gun
possession need not resemble ACCA, Project Exile, or the current web of
mandatory minimum sentencing provisions.”421
For one thing, even when it has substantially increased criminal liability
or penalties, Congress has not always been especially deliberative about it.
The Supreme Court itself has remarked on “Congress’ less-than-meticulous
drafting” of certain firearms laws,422 noting that particular provisions have
sentencing courts more discretion to impose concurrent sentences for multiple § 924(c) violations,
and clarify statutory definitions of underlying and predicate offenses); supra subsection I.B.1.
419 Patton, supra note 293, at 1039.
420 Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
421 Levin, supra note 35, at 2177-78, 2224 (“[D]espite Holder’s public criticism of mandatory
minimum sentences in the drug context, little has been said about similar sentences for pure
possessory offenses in the gun context.”).
422 United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 423 (2009).

698

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 170: 637

been “the source of much perplexity in the courts”423 or that clarifying
language was perhaps “an inadvertent casualty of a complex drafting
process.”424 Sometimes it has chalked up “syntactical awkwardness”425 or
“[p]artially overlapping provisions”426 to last minute changes to major pieces
of legislation. More focus on the provisions might lead to more attention to
their possible effects.
The research on those effects emphasizes the need for deterrence, but not
by increasing sentences. Rather, there is strong evidence that likelihood of
detection matters: predictable consequences for illegal firearms use are key.
As Philip Cook and Jens Ludwig emphasize, public safety and public health
are not incompatible goals.427 While lengthy federal sentences may not deter
gun violence, at the same time, Cook and Ludwig point out that “the dismal
clearance rates for shootings we have seen in recent years in the U.S. are a
source of concern.”428 Community-based programs seek to provide early
intervention to individuals, including behavioral health support, in order to
reduce gun violence.429
2. Reforms That Take Us Beyond the Criminal Law
Many of the patterns and pathologies of the current system bring us back
to the question: why crime? Why has the criminal legal system been the prime
way the federal government has conceptualized the problem of gun violence?
Firearms are ubiquitous in American society. Thirty percent of adults own
a gun, and eleven percent more live with someone who does.430 Most recent
estimates count more guns in civilian hands than people in the United
States.431 Indeed, the FBI experienced record numbers of background checks
Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 142 (1995).
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 589-90 (1990).
Hayes, 555 U.S. at 428.
U.S. Dep’t of Treasury v. Galioto, 477 U.S. 556, 558 (1986).
Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, Understanding Gun Violence: Public Health v. Public Policy, 38
J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 788, 791 (2019).
428 Id. at 791.
429 AM. PSYCH. ASS’N, WHAT WORKS TO REDUCE GUN VIOLENCE (2014),
https://www.apa.org/monitor/2014/02/gun-violence [https://perma.cc/C74K-6ZG8]; see also
Vizzard, Current and Future Policy, supra note 34, at 904 (“Ceasefire projects would seem to offer more
near-term hope for reducing violence than does the frustrated pursuit of new national gun laws.”).
430 Katherine Schaeffer, Key Facts About Americans and Guns, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Sept. 13, 2021),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/10/22/facts-about-guns-in-united-states
[https://perma.cc/YHP9-Y9MS].
431 Christopher Ingraham, There are More Guns Than People in the United States,
According to a New Study of Global Firearm Ownership, W ASH . P OST (June 19, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2018/06/19/there-are-more-guns-thanpeople-in-the-united-states-according-to-a-new-study-of-global-firearm-ownership
[https://perma.cc/6T7U-W2KF].
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in 2020, early in the COVID-19 pandemic, with over 3.7 million total in
March, mostly for gun purchases.432 Guns can end up in the hands of those
who cannot legally possess them. Guns can then be used as a proxy for solving
other crimes and social problems; that is how § 924(c) and ACCA are
structured: to serve as “umbrella” sentencing-enhancer offenses for other
criminal charges. We see from legislative developments and enforcement data
discussed in Parts I and II that guns have been used this way for drugs
offenses, violent offenses, and now increasingly for immigration enforcement.
There is a large and growing body of research on the causes of gun
violence, as well as the efficacy of programmatic approaches towards reducing
gun violence.433 In response to community-wide drivers of violence, a
different approach emerged by the late 1990s. It sought to respond not to
individual incidents, but rather to conduct a Group Violence Intervention
(GVI). The GVI included (1) public education targeting youth responsible
for the bulk of gun violence with focused deterrence, to ensure predictable
consequences for gun violence, (2) mobilizing community and faith leaders,
and (3) providing social services. Scholars such as Anthony Braga and David
Kennedy have researched and developed such programs, which, again, seek to
better detect and deter more broadly, as well as engage the community—and
not primarily operating through sentencing enhancements.434 Following early
success in Boston, under Operation Ceasefire, the model has been adopted in
a wide range of jurisdictions.435
That collaborative, deterrence, prevention, and community-centered
approach is very much unlike the principal approach of federal prosecutors—
which involves collaboration—but is largely focused on severe sentencing. To
be sure, community-based pilot programs to combat firearms violence have
been funded by federal grants. A hospital-based risk prevention program, for

432 Louis Beckett, Americans Purchasing Record-Breaking Numbers of Guns Amid Coronavirus,
GUARDIAN (Apr. 1, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/01/us-gun-purchasescoronavirus-record [https://perma.cc/9BUS-ABGW].
433 See, e.g., Drury D. Stevenson, Gun Violence as an Obstacle to Educational Equality, 50 U.
MEMPHIS L. REV. 1091, 1132, 1135-36 (describing community-based programs like Cure Violence
that seek to change the culture around firearms).
434 ANTHONY A. BRAGA, DAVID M. KENNEDY, ANNE M. PIEHL & ELIN J. WARING, THE
BOSTON GUN PROJECT: IMPACT EVALUATION FINDINGS 4, 19 (2000); ANTHONY A. BRAGA,
ANNE M. PIEHL & DAVID M. KENNEDY, REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE: THE BOSTON GUN
PROJECT’S OPERATION CEASEFIRE 1 (2001).
435 Anthony A. Braga & David L. Weisburd, The Effects of ‘Pulling Levers’ Focused Deterrence Strategies
on Crime, 8 CAMPBELL SYSTEMATIC REVS. 7 (2012); see also Intervention Strategies, GIFFORDS L. CTR.,
https://lawcenter.giffords.org/gun-laws/policy-areas/other-laws-policies/intervention-strategies
(explaining that Group Violence Intervention strategy was first used in Operation Ceasefire and
implemented in various other cities).
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example, has been endorsed by the Department of Justice.436 The Office of
Justice Programs, which conducts crime research for the Department of
Justice, has evaluated Group Violence Initiative efforts to reduce gun
violence.437 Congress has funded Group Violence Initiative programs, but it
awarded a fraction of what the White House had requested, with the result
that cities have had applications rejected by the DOJ.438 Other local strategies
can focus on disrupting the illegal gun sales that are associated with gun
violence.439 To date, federal law has not played a major role in such efforts,
but the Biden Administration’s new push may change that.440
We note that state lawmakers are not constrained by the same
jurisdictional limits as the federal government and can more directly target
violent crime.441 That said, state lawmakers are not uninterested in regulating
firearms use during crime. Use of a firearm is often an enhancement,
including in sentencing; and it can, for example, mean the difference between
first- and second-degree murder.442 Increasingly, however, state lawmaking—
at least in many states—is focused on a gun violence prevention approach that
does not rely upon severe sentencing. As Joseph Blocher and Jacob Charles
write, “Extreme risk protection order (“ERPO”) laws—often called ‘red flag’
laws—permit the denial of firearms to individuals who a judge has
determined present an imminent risk of harm to themselves or others.”443
These laws, then, provide a more particularized approach regarding
categories of individuals. Their focus is not primarily on criminal sentencing,
and indeed, the focus is not criminal at all: it is a civil order removing the
firearm from an individual who has been determined to be a threat to himself
436 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., DEFENDING CHILDHOOD: REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL’S NATIONAL TASK FORCE ON CHILDREN EXPOSED TO VIOLENCE 89 (2012),
https://www.justice.gov/defendingchildhood/cev-rpt-full.pdf [https://perma.cc/MK8E-VDEL].
437 These programs can be found on the National Institute of Justice’s site under Crime &
Crime Prevention Programs by searching for “group violence” in the keyword filter. Crime & Crime
Prevention, NAT’L INST. OF JUST., https://crimesolutions.ojp.gov/topics/crime-crime-prevention#-1
[https://perma.cc/Z94B-RS9C] (search for “group violence” in the keyword filter).
438 Intervention Strategies, supra note 435.
439 See Philip J. Cook, Gun Markets, 1 ANN. REV. CRIM. 359, 373-74 (2018) (positing that certain
regulation of transaction patterns, including expanding the categories of people disqualified from
owning guns, can save lives).
440 See Juana Summers, $5 Billion For Violence Prevention Is Tucked into Biden Infrastructure Plan,
NPR (Apr. 1, 2021), https://www.npr.org/2021/04/01/983103198/-5-billion-for-violence-preventionis-tucked-into-biden-infrastructure-plan [https://perma.cc/JX4D-7UE9] (reporting that President
Biden’s infrastructure plan includes $5 billion to support community-based violence prevention programs).
441 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 n.8 (2000) (noting that, unlike the federal
government’s limited powers, the Constitution reserves “a generalized police power to the States”).
442 See, e.g., N.C. GEN STAT., § 14-17(a) (defining first-degree murder as any murder that
involves the use of a “deadly weapon”).
443 Joseph Blocher & Jacob D. Charles, Firearms, Extreme Risk, and Legal Design: “Red Flag”
Laws and Due Process, 106 VA. L. REV. 1285, 1285 (2020).
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or others.444 However, these laws are often accompanied by criminal
provisions regarding violation of a red flag order, often relying upon relatively
minor fines and penalties.445
Many cities have also recently begun to establish and fund governmental
offices of violence prevention to target the systematic and underlying
concerns that lead to gun violence, often seeking solutions through noncarceral means.446 Similar types of community-based outreach efforts and
public education campaigns about the harms of the current harsh sentencing
regime may help make headway in the battle over norms and discourse.
As the American Psychological Association explains, “[r]educing the
incidence of gun violence will require interventions through multiple
systems, including legal, public health, public safety, community, and
health.”447 It is not a problem that harsher sentences can be expected to solve.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, we explore the evolution of the surprising range of federal
gun crimes, detailing the substance of and major amendments to each of the
primary criminal statutes. They cover conduct ranging from gun distribution,
possession of particular weapons such as machine guns, use by drug
traffickers, and individual possession of guns by felons.
Second, we describe how, in practice, federal prosecutors adapted their
approach to focus on certain core gun crimes over time. Enacting a universal
federal crime of gun possession during commission of any crime was (barely)
Id. at 1317 (establishing that extreme risk laws are civil proceedings with no criminal sanctions).
See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 813.12(8)(a) (2020) (“Whoever knowingly violates a temporary
restraining order or injunction issued under sub. (3) or (4) shall be fined not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned for not more than 9 months or both.”); see also FLA. STAT. § 741.30(9)(a) (2021)
(permitting the use of civil or criminal contempt proceedings to address domestic violence
injunction violations). Other such laws do not include criminal provisions. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 13-14.5-103(6)(g) (2021) (requiring subjects of temporary extreme risk protection orders to refrain
from having a firearm in their possession while the order is in effect). For an overview, see Extreme
Risk Protection Orders, GIFFORDS L. CTR., https://giffords.org/lawcenter/gun-laws/policyareas/who-can-have-a-gun/extreme-risk-protection-orders [https://perma.cc/V8KY-CNHW].
446 See Violence Prevention, MILWAUKEE HEALTH DEPT., https://city.milwaukee.gov/health/staysafe
[https://perma.cc/64FV-PUZU] (describing how the office “provides strategic direction and
oversight for City efforts to reduce risk of violence through linked strategies in partnership with
government, non-profit, neighborhood, and faith organizations”); Press Release, Mayor’s Office to
Prevent Gun Violence Set to Expand, Launch Major Peacekeeping Programs (July 10, 2018),
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/peacenyc/index.page [https://perma.cc/65BV-U7T6] (identifying the
Office to Prevent Gun Violence’s goals as working “to coordinate the city’s various anti-gun violence
initiatives, amplify community-based intervention and prevention services, and introduce
technological solutions to prevent gun violence to create safe, empowered and interconnected
communities in New York City”).
447 AM. PSYCH. ASS’N, GUN VIOLENCE: PREDICTION, PREVENTION, AND POLICY (2013),
https://www.apa.org/pubs/info/reports/gun-violence-prevention [https://perma.cc/R767-PCNL].
444
445
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rejected by Congress after the judiciary raised alarm bells concerning
federalism and docket congestion. Nor has a more cooperative federalism
approach worked in the background-check setting, where financial incentives
and penalties provide more indirect means to carry out federal priorities.
Instead, the middle course—relying on a powerful felon-in-possession statute
in close collaboration with state and local prosecutors—has promoted the
federal interest in imposing severe penalties in firearms cases. Most recently,
such efforts have also become prominent in immigration prosecutions.
Third, this expanded statutory and enforcement regime has provided
vehicles for constitutional litigation testing the reach of federal criminal
jurisdiction, use of federal crimes as sentencing enhancements, and
boundaries between federal, state, and local enforcement. And yet that
litigation has not meaningfully hampered enforcement. At best,
constitutional rulings have channeled enforcement, including in ways that
may have magnified inequities.
We argue that federal gun crimes are not just a microcosm of larger federal
priorities regarding gun regulation or criminal prosecution priorities. Rather,
they have their own logic. We have described how three factors dominate: (1)
aggressive interest-group lobbying that ends in legislative compromise on
harsh punishment; (2) judges and lawmakers dichotomize guns, contrasting
their possession by “law-abiding citizens” with that of “thugs” and
“gangsters”; and (3) prosecutorial power that is magnified in this area due to
the ubiquity of firearms in communities and in criminal activity in the United
States, together with federal prosecutors’ ability to leverage sentencing to
obtain favorable plea bargains.
In few other areas is there such intensive lobbying on both sides when
criminal statutes are enacted. Federal gun crimes reflect a unique dynamic in
which legislation is shaped by aggressive lobbying by interest groups, the
special resources and discretion of federal prosecutors, and the ubiquity of
firearms in communities and in criminal activity in the United States. Federal
firearms crimes should be understood as central to federal prosecution, just
as the fraud and drug statutes have long been. With powerful forces arrayed
on both sides, by the 1980s, statutes reflected a settlement: regulation of the
manufacture and distribution of firearms was limited, while increasingly severe
criminal penalties for individuals continued to expand in their reach. Those
penalties in turn empowered prosecutors seeking leverage in plea bargaining.
As a result, gun crimes represent a special story in federal criminal law, in
which prosecutors, Congress, and interest groups have remained very much
aligned. From a criminal law perspective, then, federal gun law looks quite
unified and consistent, with an extensive focus on punishing individuals in
order to target a wide range of criminal conduct—ranging from primarily to
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only tangentially gun-related. The result magnifies inequality in sentencing
outcomes, often in cases having little connection to gun violence, while
ignoring underlying causes of gun violence. The federal government has
supported non-carceral gun violence prevention programs, but to a limited
extent. The powerful political and institutional forces that fixed felon-inpossession prosecution as a cornerstone of federal law and prosecution
strategy continue to occupy the field.
The trajectory of federal gun crimes has been clear. Whether the federal
approach will arc towards a more grounded approach remains to be seen. A
new direction is apparent in the states, where the recent focus has been on
non-criminal red flag laws, other restrictions on gun possession and
purchasing, as well as community programs focused on deterrence and
prevention.448 Thus, while coherent from a political economy perspective,
from a policy perspective, federal gun crime does not achieve a federal,
systematic, non-discriminatory, and collaborative effort to address the deep
American problem of gun violence.

448 For a further summary of these gun violence intervention strategies, see Intervention
Strategies, supra note 435.
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APPENDIX: STATUTORY CHANGES TO 18 U.S.C. § 924(C)
Underlined text = additions
Strikethrough text = deletions
Act
Modifications to Text
1968—Pub. L. (c) Whoever—
(1) uses a firearm to commit any felony which may be prosecuted
90-618 § 102
in a court of the United States, or
(2) carries a firearm unlawfully during the commission of any
Gun Control
felony which may be prosecuted in a court of the United States,
Act of 1968
shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for not less than
one year nor more than 10 years. In the case of his second or
subsequent conviction under this subsection, such person shall
be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for not less than five
years nor more than 25 years, and, notwithstanding any other
provision of law, the court shall not suspend the sentence of such
person or give him a probationary sentence.
1971—Pub. L. (c) Whoever—
91–644
(1) uses a firearm to commit any felony for which he may be
prosecuted in a court of the United States, or
Omnibus
(2) carries a firearm unlawfully during the commission of any felony
Crime Control for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United States,
Act of 1970
shall, in addition to the punishment provided for the
commission of such felony, be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than 10 ten
years. In the case of his second or subsequent conviction under
this subsection, such person shall be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment for not less than five two years nor more than 25
twenty-five years, and, notwithstanding any other provision of
law, the court shall not suspend the sentence in the case of a
second or subsequent conviction of such person or give him a
probationary sentence, nor shall the term of imprisonment
imposed under this subsection run concurrently with any term
of imprisonment imposed for the commission of such felony.
1984—Pub. L. (c) Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence,
98–473,
including a crime of violence which provides for enhanced
punishment if committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous
§ 1005(a)
weapon or device, for which he may be prosecuted in a court of
the United States, uses or carries a firearm,
(1) uses a firearm to commit any felony for which he may be
prosecuted in a court of the United States, or
(2) carries a firearm unlawfully during the commission of any felony
for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United States,
shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime of
violencethe commission of such felony, be sentenced to a term
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of imprisonment for not less than onefive years nor more than
ten years. In the case of his second or subsequent conviction
under this subsection, such person shall be sentenced to a term
of imprisonment for not less than twoten years. nor more than
twenty-five years, and, n Notwithstanding any other provision
of law, the court shall not place on probation or suspend the
sentence in the case of a second or subsequent conviction of such
any person convicted of a violation of this subsectionor give him
a probationary sentence, nor shall the term of imprisonment
imposed under this subsection run concurrently with any other
term of imprisonment imposed including that imposed for the
commission of such felony crime of violence in which the
firearm was used or carried. No person sentenced under this
subsection shall be eligible for parole during the term of
imprisonment imposed herein.
(c)(1) Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence
or drug trafficking crime, including a crime of violence or drug
trafficking crime, which provides for enhanced punishment if
committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon or
device, for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United
States, uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the
punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug
trafficking crime, be sentenced to imprisonment for five years,
and if the firearm is a machinegun, or is equipped with a firearm
silencer or firearm muffler, to imprisonment for ten years. In the
case of his second or subsequent conviction under this
subsection, such person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for
ten years, and if the firearm is a machinegun, or is equipped with
a firearm silencer or firearm muffler, to imprisonment for
twenty years. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the
court shall not place on probation or suspend the sentence of
any person convicted of a violation of this subsection, nor shall
the term of imprisonment imposed under this subsection run
concurrently with any other term of imprisonment imposed
including that imposed for the crime of violence or drug
trafficking crime, or drug trafficking crime in which the firearm
was used or carried. No person sentenced under this subsection
shall be eligible for parole during the term of imprisonment
imposed herein.
(2) For purposes of this subsection, the term ‘drug trafficking
crime’ means any felony violation of Federal law involving the
distribution, manufacture, or importation of any controlled
substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances
Act (21 U.S.C. 802)).
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(3) For purposes of this subsection the term ‘crime of violence’
means an offense that is a felony and—
(A) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use
of physical force against the person or property of another,
or
(B) that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical
force against the person or property of another may be used in
the course of committing the offense.
(c)(1) Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence or
drug trafficking crime, (including a crime of violence or drug
trafficking crime, which provides for enhanced punishment if
committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon or device),
for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United States,
uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment
provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime, be
sentenced to imprisonment for five years, and if the firearm is a
machinegun, or is equipped with a firearm silencer or firearm
muffler, to imprisonment for ten thirty years. In the case of his
second or subsequent conviction under this subsection, such
person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for ten twenty years,
and if the firearm is a machinegun, or is equipped with a firearm
silencer or firearm muffler, to imprisonment for twenty years life
imprisonment without release. Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, the court shall not place on probation or suspend
the sentence of any person convicted of a violation of this
subsection, nor shall the term of imprisonment imposed under
this subsection run concurrently with any other term of
imprisonment imposed including that imposed for the crime of
violence or drug trafficking crime, or drug trafficking crime in
which the firearm was used or carried. No person sentenced under
this subsection shall be eligible for parole during the term of
imprisonment imposed herein.
(2) For purposes of this subsection, the term ‘drug trafficking
crime’ means any felony punishable under the Controlled
Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.), the Controlled
Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 951 et seq.), or
the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (46 U.S.C. App. 1901
et seq.) violation of Federal law involving the distribution,
manufacture, or importation of any controlled substance (as defined
in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802)).
(3) For purposes of this subsection the term ‘crime of violence’
means an offense that is a felony and—
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(A) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use
of physical force against the person or property of another,
or
(B) that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical
force against the person or property of another may be used in
the course of committing the offense.
(c)(1) Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence
or drug trafficking crime (including a crime of violence or drug
trafficking crime which provides for enhanced punishment if
committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon or
device) for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United
States, uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the
punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug
trafficking crime, be sentenced to imprisonment for five years,
and if the firearm is a short-barreled rifle, short-barreled
shotgun, to imprisonment for ten years, and if the firearm is a
machinegun, or destructive device, or is equipped with a firearm
silencer or firearm muffler, to imprisonment for thirty years. In
the case of his second or subsequent conviction under this
subsection, such person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for
twenty years, and if the firearm is a machinegun, or destructive
device, or is equipped with a firearm silencer or firearm muffler,
to imprisonment for life imprisonment without release.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court shall not
place on probation or suspend the sentence of any person
convicted of a violation of this subsection, nor shall the term of
imprisonment imposed under this subsection run concurrently
with any other term of imprisonment imposed including that
imposed for the crime of violence or drug trafficking crime in
which the firearm was used or carried. No person sentenced
under this subsection shall be eligible for parole during the term
of imprisonment imposed herein.
(2) For purposes of this subsection, the term ‘drug trafficking
crime’ means any felony any felony punishable under the
Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.), the
Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 951 et
seq.), or the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (46 U.S.C.
App. 1901 et seq.).
(3) For purposes of this subsection the term ‘crime of violence’
means an offense that is a felony and—
(A) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use
of physical force against the person or property of another,
or
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(B) that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical
force against the person or property of another may be used in
the course of committing the offense.
(c)(1) Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence
or drug trafficking crime (including a crime of violence or drug
trafficking crime which provides for enhanced punishment if
committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon or
device) for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United
States, uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the
punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug
trafficking crime, be sentenced to imprisonment for five years,
and if the firearm is a short-barreled rifle, short-barreled
shotgun, or semiautomatic assault weapon, to imprisonment for
ten years, and if the firearm is a machinegun, or destructive
device, or is equipped with a firearm silencer or firearm muffler,
to imprisonment for thirty years. In the case of his second or
subsequent conviction under this subsection, such person shall
be sentenced to imprisonment for twenty years, and if the
firearm is a machinegun, or destructive device, or is equipped
with a firearm silencer or firearm muffler, to life imprisonment
without release. Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
the court shall not place on probation or suspend the sentence
of any person convicted of a violation of this subsection, nor
shall the term of imprisonment imposed under this subsection
run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment imposed
including that imposed for the crime of violence or drug
trafficking crime in which the firearm was used or carried. No
person sentenced under this subsection shall be eligible for
parole during the term of imprisonment imposed herein.
(2) For purposes of this subsection, the term ‘drug trafficking
crime’ means any felony any felony punishable under the
Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.), the
Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 951 et
seq.), or the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (46 U.S.C.
App. 1901 et seq.).
(3) For purposes of this subsection the term ‘crime of violence’
means an offense that is a felony and—
(A) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use
of physical force against the person or property of another,
or
(B) that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical
force against the person or property of another may be used in
the course of committing the offense.
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(c)(1)(A) Except to the extent that a greater minimum sentence is
otherwise provided by this subsection or by any other provision
of law, Whoeverany person who, during and in relation to any
crime of violence or drug trafficking crime (including a crime of
violence or drug trafficking crime which that provides for an
enhanced punishment if committed by the use of a deadly or
dangerous weapon or device) for which he the person may be
prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or carries a
firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a
firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such
crime of violence or drug trafficking crime—,
(i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 for
five years;,
(ii) if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of not less than 7 years; and
(iii) if the firearm is discharged, be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of not less than 10 years.
(B) and iIf the firearm possessed by a person convicted of a
violation of this subsection—
(i) is a short-barreled rifle, short-barreled shotgun, or
semiautomatic assault weapon, the person shall be sentenced to
a term of imprisonment for of not less than 10ten years;, or
(ii) and if the firearm is a machinegun, or destructive device, or
is equipped with a firearm silencer or firearm muffler, the person
shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for of not less than
30thirty years.
(C) In the case of his a second or subsequent conviction under
this subsection, such the person shall—
(i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for of not less than
25twenty years,; and
(ii) if the firearm involved is a machinegun, or a destructive
device, or is equipped with a firearm silencer or firearm muffler,
be sentenced to life imprisonment for lifewithout release.
(D) Notwithstanding any other provision of law—,
(i) the a court shall not place on probation or suspend the
sentence of any person convicted of a violation of this
subsection,; and
(ii) nor shall theno term of imprisonment imposed on a person
under this subsection run concurrently with any other term of
imprisonment imposed on the person, including that any term
of imprisonment imposed for the crime of violence or drug
trafficking crime in during which the firearm was used, or
carried, or possessed.
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(2) For purposes of this subsection, the term ‘drug trafficking
crime’ means any felony any felony punishable under the
Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.), the
Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 951 et
seq.), or the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (46 U.S.C.
App. 1901 et seq.).
(3) For purposes of this subsection the term ‘crime of violence’
means an offense that is a felony and—
(A) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use
of physical force against the person or property of another,
or
(B) that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical
force against the person or property of another may be used in
the course of committing the offense.

2005—Pub. L.
109–92, § 6
Protection of
Lawful
Commerce in
Arms Act

(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term ‘brandish’ means,
with respect to a firearm, to display all or part of the firearm, or
otherwise make the presence of the firearm known to another
person, in order to intimidate that person, regardless of whether
the firearm is directly visible to that person.
(c)(1)(A) Except to the extent that a greater minimum sentence is
otherwise provided by this subsection or by any other provision
of law, any person who, during and in relation to any crime of
violence or drug trafficking crime (including a crime of violence
or drug trafficking crime that provides for an enhanced
punishment if committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous
weapon or device) for which the person may be prosecuted in a
court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm, or who, in
furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm, shall, in
addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence
or drug trafficking crime—
(i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 years;
(ii) if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of not less than 7 years; and
(iii) if the firearm is discharged, be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of not less than 10 years.
(B) If the firearm possessed by a person convicted of a violation
of this subsection—
(i) is a short-barreled rifle, short-barreled shotgun, or semiautomatic
assault weapon, the person shall be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of not less than 10 years; or
(ii) is a machinegun or destructive device, or is equipped with a
firearm silencer or firearm muffler, the person shall be sentenced
to a term of imprisonment of not less than 30 years.
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(C) In the case of a second or subsequent conviction under this
subsection, the person shall—
(i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 25
years; and
(ii) if the firearm involved is a machinegun or a destructive device,
or is equipped with a firearm silencer or firearm muffler, be
sentenced to imprisonment for life.
(D) Notwithstanding any other provision of law—
(i) a court shall not place on probation any person convicted of a
violation of this subsection; and
(ii) no term of imprisonment imposed on a person under this
subsection run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment
imposed on the person, including any term of imprisonment
imposed for the crime of violence or drug trafficking crime during
which the firearm was used, carried, or possessed.
(2) For purposes of this subsection, the term ‘drug trafficking
crime’ means any felony any felony punishable under the
Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.), the
Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 951 et
seq.), or the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (46 U.S.C.
App. 1901 et seq.).
(3) For purposes of this subsection the term ‘crime of violence’
means an offense that is a felony and—
(A) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use
of physical force against the person or property of another,
or
(B) that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical
force against the person or property of another may be used in
the course of committing the offense.
(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term ‘brandish’ means,
with respect to a firearm, to display all or part of the firearm, or
otherwise make the presence of the firearm known to another
person, in order to intimidate that person, regardless of whether
the firearm is directly visible to that person.
(5) Except to the extent that a greater minimum sentence is
otherwise provided under this subsection, or by any other
provision of law, any person who, during and in relation to any
crime of violence or drug trafficking crime (including a crime of
violence or drug trafficking crime that provides for an enhanced
punishment if committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous
weapon or device) for which the person may be prosecuted in a
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court of the United States, uses or carries armor piercing
ammunition, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses
armor piercing ammunition, shall, in addition to the punishment
provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime or
conviction under this section—
(A) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 15
years; and
(B) if death results from the use of such ammunition—
(i) if the killing is murder (as defined in section 1111), be
punished by death or sentenced to a term of imprisonment for
any term of years or for life; and
(ii) if the killing is manslaughter (as defined in section 1112), be
punished as provided in section 1112.
(c)(1)(A) Except to the extent that a greater minimum sentence
is otherwise provided by this subsection or by any other
provision of law, any person who, during and in relation to any
crime of violence or drug trafficking crime (including a crime of
violence or drug trafficking crime that provides for an enhanced
punishment if committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous
weapon or device) for which the person may be prosecuted in a
court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm, or who, in
furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm, shall, in
addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence
or drug trafficking crime—
(i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 years;
(ii) if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of not less than 7 years; and
(iii) if the firearm is discharged, be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of not less than 10 years.
(B) If the firearm possessed by a person convicted of a violation
of this subsection—
(i) is a short-barreled rifle, short-barreled shotgun, or semiautomatic
assault weapon, the person shall be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of not less than 10 years; or
(ii) is a machinegun or destructive device, or is equipped with a
firearm silencer or firearm muffler, the person shall be sentenced
to a term of imprisonment of not less than 30 years.
(C) In the case of a second or subsequent conviction under this
subsection, the person shall—
(i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 25
years; and
(ii) if the firearm involved is a machinegun or a destructive device,
or is equipped with a firearm silencer or firearm muffler, be
sentenced to imprisonment for life.
(D) Notwithstanding any other provision of law—
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(i) a court shall not place on probation any person convicted of a
violation of this subsection; and
(ii) no term of imprisonment imposed on a person under this
subsection run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment
imposed on the person, including any term of imprisonment
imposed for the crime of violence or drug trafficking crime during
which the firearm was used, carried, or possessed.
(2) For purposes of this subsection, the term ‘drug trafficking
crime’ means any felony any felony punishable under the
Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.), the
Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 951 et
seq.), or chapter 705 of title 46the Maritime Drug Law
Enforcement Act (46 U.S.C. App. 1901 et seq.).
(3) For purposes of this subsection the term ‘crime of violence’
means an offense that is a felony and—
(A) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use
of physical force against the person or property of another,
or
(B) that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical
force against the person or property of another may be used in
the course of committing the offense.
(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term ‘brandish’ means,
with respect to a firearm, to display all or part of the firearm, or
otherwise make the presence of the firearm known to another
person, in order to intimidate that person, regardless of whether
the firearm is directly visible to that person.
(5) Except to the extent that a greater minimum sentence is
otherwise provided under this subsection, or by any other
provision of law, any person who, during and in relation to any
crime of violence or drug trafficking crime (including a crime of
violence or drug trafficking crime that provides for an enhanced
punishment if committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous
weapon or device) for which the person may be prosecuted in a
court of the United States, uses or carries armor piercing
ammunition, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses
armor piercing ammunition, shall, in addition to the punishment
provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime or
conviction under this section—
(A) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 15
years; and
(B) if death results from the use of such ammunition—
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(i) if the killing is murder (as defined in section 1111), be
punished by death or sentenced to a term of imprisonment for
any term of years or for life; and
(ii) if the killing is manslaughter (as defined in section 1112), be
punished as provided in section 1112.
(c)(1)(A) Except to the extent that a greater minimum sentence is
otherwise provided by this subsection or by any other provision
of law, any person who, during and in relation to any crime of
violence or drug trafficking crime (including a crime of violence
or drug trafficking crime that provides for an enhanced
punishment if committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous
weapon or device) for which the person may be prosecuted in a
court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm, or who, in
furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm, shall, in
addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence
or drug trafficking crime—
(i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 years;
(ii) if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of not less than 7 years; and
(iii) if the firearm is discharged, be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of not less than 10 years.
(B) If the firearm possessed by a person convicted of a violation
of this subsection—
(i) is a short-barreled rifle, short-barreled shotgun, or semiautomatic
assault weapon, the person shall be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of not less than 10 years; or
(ii) is a machinegun or destructive device, or is equipped with a
firearm silencer or firearm muffler, the person shall be sentenced
to a term of imprisonment of not less than 30 years.
(C) In the case of a second or subsequent conviction under this
subsection violation of this subsection that occurs after a prior
conviction under this subsection has become final, the person shall—
(i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 25
years; and
(ii) if the firearm involved is a machinegun or a destructive device,
or is equipped with a firearm silencer or firearm muffler, be
sentenced to imprisonment for life.
(D) Notwithstanding any other provision of law—
(i) a court shall not place on probation any person convicted of a
violation of this subsection; and
(ii) no term of imprisonment imposed on a person under this
subsection run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment
imposed on the person, including any term of imprisonment
imposed for the crime of violence or drug trafficking crime during
which the firearm was used, carried, or possessed.

2021]

The Trajectory of Federal Gun Crimes

715

(2) For purposes of this subsection, the term ‘drug trafficking
crime’ means any felony any felony punishable under the
Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.), the
Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 951 et
seq.), or chapter 705 of title 46.
(3) For purposes of this subsection the term ‘crime of violence’
means an offense that is a felony and—
(A) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use
of physical force against the person or property of another,
or
(B) that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical
force against the person or property of another may be used in
the course of committing the offense.
(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term ‘brandish’ means,
with respect to a firearm, to display all or part of the firearm, or
otherwise make the presence of the firearm known to another
person, in order to intimidate that person, regardless of whether
the firearm is directly visible to that person.
(5) Except to the extent that a greater minimum sentence is
otherwise provided under this subsection, or by any other
provision of law, any person who, during and in relation to any
crime of violence or drug trafficking crime (including a crime of
violence or drug trafficking crime that provides for an enhanced
punishment if committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous
weapon or device) for which the person may be prosecuted in a
court of the United States, uses or carries armor piercing
ammunition, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses
armor piercing ammunition, shall, in addition to the punishment
provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime or
conviction under this section—
(A) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 15
years; and
(B) if death results from the use of such ammunition—
(i) if the killing is murder (as defined in section 1111), be
punished by death or sentenced to a term of imprisonment for
any term of years or for life; and
(ii) if the killing is manslaughter (as defined in section 1112), be
punished as provided in section 1112.
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